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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional theorists have grappled with the countermajoritarian
difficulty for several decades.' The difficulty arises from the seemingly
irreconcilable tension between two competing values, both of which are
core values of the American legal and political system. On the one hand,
as John Hart Ely said, "[R]ule in accord with the consent of a majority
of those governed is the core of the American governmental system."2
On the other hand, we have an equally firm commitment to individual
rights, which are protected by an independent judiciary that has the
power to invalidate laws enacted by democratically elected legislatures.
The exercise of judicial review, which is necessary for the protection of
individual rights, is at odds with the principle of majoritarian democracy. Thus, as Ely noted, the core difficulty, "has been and remains that
of devising a way or ways of protecting minorities from majority tyranny that is not a flagrant contradiction of the principle of majority
rule."3
In Ely's view, one way to help mitigate the tension between majority
rule and individual rights is to ensure that "the channels of political par-

1. See Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 334 (1998) (describing the countermajoritarian difficulty as "the central obsession of modem constitutional scholarship"); Mark V.
Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1502, 1502 (1985)
(stating that most recent work in the field of constitutional theory "takes as its central problem... the 'countermajoritarian difficulty' with judicial review").
2. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1980).
3. Id. at 8.
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ticipation and communication are kept open."' If the Supreme Court invalidates a state law on the grounds that the law is unconstitutional, the
Court closes the channels of political participation because Congress
cannot reverse a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court. Suppose,
though, that the Supreme Court invalidated the same state law on the
grounds that the law conflicted with the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR),5 a human rights treaty to which the
United States is a party. This would ensure that the channels of political
participation remain open, because Congress would retain the power to
enact legislation superseding the treaty as a matter of domestic law if
Congress disliked the result of the Supreme Court decision. Thus, if
courts based their decisions on the ICCPR instead of the Constitution,
they could protect fundamental rights in a manner that is consistent with
the principle of majority rule.
There is, however, a significant obstacle to judicial enforcement of
the ICCPR. When the United States ratified the ICCPR, it adopted a set
of reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that restrict
judicial application of the treaty.' Ironically, the Senate adopted the
RUDs for the ostensible purpose of preserving Congress' role in making
decisions about the domestic application of human rights treaties.7 In
fact, though, the RUDs have had precisely the opposite effect: they have
precluded congressional participation in the decision-making process by
channeling human rights litigation away from treaty-based claims, and
towards constitutional claims.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Roper v. Simmons illustrates
this point In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits imposition of capital punishment for crimes
committed by a person who was less than eighteen years old when he
committed the crime. The Court cited several international human rights
treaties in support of its holding.' In short, the Court applied interna4. Id. at 76.
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
S. EXEC. DOc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
6. See I Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at 31 December
2004, at 184-85, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/23 (2005) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties]. See
also David Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J.INT'L L. 129 (1999) (analyzing the effect of the
RUDs).
7. See infra Part Ill.
8. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
9. See id. at 574-78.
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tional human rights law indirectly in support of a constitutional ruling.
By basing its holding on constitutional grounds, the Court precluded
Congress from participating in the decision about the domestic application of the international norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. If
the United States had ratified the LCCPR without any RUDs, though, the
Court could have ruled in Simmons that Article 6 of the ICCPR prohibits the execution of juvenile offenders.'" If the Court had applied the
treaty directly, it would have maintained open channels of political participation, because Congress would have retained the power to enact
legislation superseding the treaty.
This article analyzes the domestic application of international human
rights law from the standpoint of Ely's political process theory. The article contends that an Elysian theory favors direct application of international human rights treaties, rather than indirect application of international law as an aid to constitutional interpretation, because direct
application keeps the channels of political participation open. Moreover,
there are certain areas of substantive law, such as capital punishment,
where the Supreme Court functions as the primary lawmaker in the
United States. The Supreme Court establishes the primary rules governing capital punishment by exercising its power to interpret the Constitution. State legislatures implement those rules by modifying their
statutes to conform to standards established by the Court. Meanwhile,
Congress sits on the sidelines. This arrangement is manifestly at odds
with principles of majoritarian democracy. Therefore, from an Elysian
viewpoint, in areas of law like capital punishment where Congress takes
a back seat to judicial lawmaking, direct application of human rights
treaties would be democracy enhancing, compared to the current system
of constitutional lawmaking by the Supreme Court, because direct application of human rights treaties would increase opportunities for congressional participation in the lawmaking process."
In the past few years, there has been a good deal of scholarly commentary about the Supreme Court's use of international law as a guide
to constitutional interpretation. Several commentators who criticize the
10. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 5 ("Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.").
11.As others have noted, "democracy" is a contested concept, which means different things
to different people. See Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracv, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795,
796 (1999). In advancing the claim that direct application of international human rights treaties
could be democracy enhancing, this article assumes an Elysian theory of democratic selfgovernance, without attempting to defend the advantages of that theory, compared to other theories.
HeinOnline -- 47 Va. J. Int'l L. 4 2006-2007
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Court's use of international law have emphasized that the practice is
countermajoritarian. 2 Those who support the Supreme Court's use of
international law generally defend the practice on other grounds, 3 while
attempting to sidestep charges that the practice is anti-democratic. 4 This
article is the first to defend the thesis that judicial application of international human rights law can be used to promote the values of majoritarian democracy."
This article proposes legislation to channel capital punishment litiga12. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 1-14

(2003) (contending that judicial activism undermines majoritarian democracy, and that the increasing tendency of national courts "to cite foreign constitutional decisions as guides to the interpretation of their own constitutions" is one manifestation of judicial activism); Justice Antonin
Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 305 (2004) (contending that comparative analysis of foreign legal materials is not relevant
to constitutional interpretation, but it is useful "as a source of example and experience that we
may use, democratically, to change our laws"); Roger P. Alford, Misusing InternationalSources
to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 58-61 (2004) (discussing the "international
countermajoritarian difficulty").
13. See. e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Our InternationalConstitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2006) (contending that U.S. courts have regularly used international law in constitutional
interpretation for more than two hundred years); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International
Law in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 88 (2004) ("[T]he Supreme Court has
reason to examine international human rights norms and decisions interpreting them for the normative and functional insights that they may provide on analogous issues of constitutional
right."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1116-19 (2000)
(contending that national courts can gain helpful insights from the constitutional decisions of
other national courts); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108
YALE L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999) (analyzing "functionalism," "expressivism," and "bricolage" as
three different ways "in which comparing constitutional experience elsewhere might contribute to
interpreting the U.S. Constitution"); Melissa A. Waters, MediatingNorms and Identity. The Role
of TransnationalJudicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J.
487, 489-90 (2005) (contending that U.S. courts, by utilizing international law in constitutional
interpretation, can help shape "the content of international legal norms and the process by which
those norms are created").
14. But see Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L.
43, 55 (2004) (contending, in response to the charge that judicial application of international law
is anti-democratic, that U.S. courts are expected "to apply enduring principles of law to evolving
circumstance without regard to the will of shifting democratic majorities").
15. Professor Chander has advanced the related claim that "transnational legal process is consistent with democracy" because it does not remove issues "from the majoritarian political process." Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1203 (2005). However,
his aim is to rebut claims that there is "a democratic deficit at the international level," id. at 1196,
whereas this article attempts to rebut claims that judicial application of international law is countermajoritarian in the domestic sphere. Other scholars have argued that international trade law can
enhance democracy in the domestic sphere. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian,
The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 514 (2000) ("If its powers remain properly limited, the WTO will promote the power of national democratic majorities by constraining
the influence of protectionist interest groups."). However, their argument focuses exclusively on
international trade law, whereas this article focuses on international human rights law.
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tion away from constitutional adjudication, and to encourage direct application of the ICCPR by U.S. courts as a substitute for constitutional
decision-making. The proposed legislation would authorize state and
federal courts to apply Article 6 of the ICCPR directly in cases where
capital defendants actually do raise, or potentially could raise, treatybased defenses to capital punishment. Additionally, the legislation
would require courts to address the treaty-based defense first, and to
avoid constitutional decisions in cases where defendants could obtain
relief on the basis of the treaty.
The proposed legislation would not transfer power from the states to
the federal government because the federal courts already function as
the primary lawmakers with respect to capital punishment. 16 Thus, as a
practical matter, the proposed legislation would transfer lawmaking
power from the courts to Congress, thereby increasing opportunities for
congressional participation in decisions about the domestic legal protection to be accorded to individual human rights. Although the proposed
legislation focuses exclusively on capital punishment, the basic approach could be extended to other areas of substantive law as well. A
similar approach could be used to enhance the democratic nature of the
lawmaking process in any area of substantive law within the scope of
the ICCPR where two criteria are satisfied: international law is more
rights-protective than current domestic law; and the courts, rather than
Congress, currently function as the primary lawmaking institution in the
United States.
At first blush, the proposed legislation appears to run directly counter
to other recent legislative proposals designed to preclude the domestic
application of international human rights norms. In March 2004, the
House Subcommittee on the Constitution approved House Resolution
568, which expresses the view "that judicial determinations regarding
the meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based in
whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions."' 17 A similar bill introduced in February 2005, House Resolution 97, attracted sixty-five cosponsors.'8 During hearings on House
Resolution 97, the Subcommittee Chairman cited Simmons as an example of the Supreme Court's misplaced reliance on international and for16. Some commentators will undoubtedly object to the proposed legislation on federalism
grounds. For a response to this objection, see infra notes 213-26 and accompanying text.
17. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c 108:H.RES.568.IH:.
18. See H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c109:H.RES.97.IH:.
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eign authorities.' 9
The proponents of House Resolution 568 and House Resolution 97
criticize the Supreme Court's use of international law on the grounds
that it is contrary to principles of majoritarian democracy." Even so,
there are grounds to suspect that legislators may be using the rhetoric of
democratic process to conceal a base form of xenophobic nationalism,
which may be the true motivation for the proposed legislation. Legislators who are motivated primarily by xenophobic nationalism will undoubtedly oppose the proposed legislation, because it would increase
the use of international law in U.S. courts. Legislators whose primary
motivation is to make the decision-making process more democratic,
though, should welcome the proposed legislation, because it would restrict the scope of judicial lawmaking, and strengthen the role of Congress in establishing the human rights standards to be applied in U.S.
courts.
This article is divided into five parts. Part I draws upon John Hart
Ely's political process theory to analyze the Supreme Court's indirect
application of international human rights law as an aid to constitutional
interpretation. Part II then applies Elysian theory to analyze the direct
application of international human rights treaties as an alternative to
constitutional adjudication. Parts I and II, together, demonstrate that direct application is preferable to indirect application from the standpoint
of Elysian theory, because direct application maintains open channels
for political participation. Part III demonstrates that the RUDs attached
to the U.S. instrument of ratification for the ICCPR have had the perverse effect of channeling human rights litigation away from direct application of human rights treaties toward indirect application in the context of constitutional adjudication.
Whereas Parts I through III present a diagnosis, Part IV prescribes a
cure. Specifically, Part IV recommends legislation that would remove
the U.S. death penalty reservation, authorize direct judicial application
of Article 6 of the ICCPR in death penalty cases, and require courts to
avoid constitutional decisions, whenever possible, by deciding capital
19. See House Resolution on the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation
of the Constitution of the United States: Hearing on H.R. Res. 97 Before the Subcomm. of the
Constitution of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (opening statement of
Chairman Steve Chabot) available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
hju22494.000/hju22494_Of.htm.
20. See id. (prepared statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz) (stating that the Supreme
Court's reliance on international and foreign law as a guide to constitutional interpretation "raises
fundamental issues of democratic self-governance").
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punishment cases on the basis of the 1CCPR. By encouraging direct application of treaties as a substitute for constitutional decision-making,
the legislation would enhance Congress' role in the decision-making
process, because Congress would retain the power to change the law if
it was dissatisfied with the results of judicial decisions. Although the
proposed legislation focuses exclusively on capital punishment, it provides a model for legislation in other areas of substantive law within the
scope of the ICCPR where the courts, rather than Congress, currently
function as the primary lawmaking institution in the United States.
Part V addresses various constitutional objections to the proposed
legislation. The article concludes that the proposed legislation is constitutionally sound and offers significant policy benefits. Even so, Congress is unlikely to adopt the proposed legislation because Congress as a
whole prefers to duck responsibility by letting the courts make the rules
governing capital punishment. Additionally, many Congressmen, influenced by xenophobic nationalism, are staunchly opposed to the domestic application of international human rights law in any form, even if the
suggested mechanism would augment congressional control over decisions involving the domestic application of international human rights
norms.
I.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION

In both Lawrence v. Texas2' and Roper v. Simmons,2 the Supreme
Court used international law indirectly as an aid to constitutional interpretation. Part I analyzes the Court's use of international law in these
two cases. The first section shows that international law had a greater
influence on the Court's decision in Simmons than in Lawrence. The
second section briefly analyzes the two decisions from the standpoint of
John Hart Ely's political process theory.
A.

Indirect Application of InternationalLaw in Lawrence and
Simmons

1. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence, the issue presented was "[w]hether Petitioners' criminal
convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate
21. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
22. 543 U.S. 551(2005).
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their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."23 In 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court upheld the validity of a Georgia law criminalizing private, consensual homosexual conduct.24 Lawrence expressly overruled
Bowers,"2 invalidating Texas' deviate sexual intercourse statute on the
grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
The majority's analysis in Lawrence can be divided into two sections.
In the first portion of its opinion, the majority argued that Bowers was
wrong at the time it was decided. In this context, the opinion discussed
pre-Bowers case law protecting the right to privacy, 2 analyzed the history of laws directed at homosexual conduct, 27 and cited evidence of an
''emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 8 The majority concluded this portion of its opinion with a
paragraph discussing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, a case challenging a
Northern Ireland law that criminalized private, consensual homosexual
conduct. " In Dudgeon, decided five years before Bowers, the European
Court of Human Rights held that the law at issue violated Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights." In Lawrence, the majority
noted that the European Court's decision in Dudgeon "is at odds with
the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in

23. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). Petitioners also raised an Equal Protection
challenge. See id. at 563. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the result, would have decided the case
on Equal Protection grounds. See id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority, though,
based its holding on the Due Process Clause. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas, in dissent,
would have rejected both the Due Process and the Equal Protection claims. See id. at 586-605
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
25. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
26. Id. at 564-66.
27. d. at 567-71.
28. Id. at 572.
29. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981).
30. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention]. Article 8 provides as follows:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society... for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
Id. at art. 8.
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our Western civilization."'"
The second portion of the majority's analysis in Lawrence contended
that the Court's prior holding in Bowers had been undermined by subsequent developments. In this context, the majority summarized changes
in state legislation,32 discussed key Supreme Court decisions after Bowers that "cast its holding into even more doubt,"33 and noted "criticism
from other sources." The majority devoted an additional paragraph to
analyzing the development of international law and practice since Bowers. It cited three more decisions of the European Court, noted that other
nations "have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct," and concluded that "[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries."35
International law featured prominently in the Court's opinion in Lawrence. The Court devoted two full paragraphs to a discussion of international law and practice, citing four different decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights. Although the Court also cited many of its own
decisions, none of those decisions specifically addressed the right of
homosexuals to engage in private, consensual sexual activity, except for
Bowers v. Hardwick,36 which reached the opposite result. Thus, the decisions of the European Court were the only judicial precedents cited by
the Court that directly supported its holding in Lawrence.
Even so, if there was no international law on point, the majority could
have written essentially the same opinion, deleting only two paragraphs.
It is likely that the majority would have found the arguments presented
in the remainder of the opinion sufficiently compelling to support its
conclusion that the Texas statute violated the Due Process Clause. Thus,
international law did not drive the outcome in Lawrence; it merely supported an outcome that the Court would probably have reached in any
case. In Simmons, though, international law arguably did drive the outcome.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 576-77.
478 U.S. 186(1986).
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2. Roper v. Simmons
In Simmons, the issue presented was whether it is permissible under
the Eighth Amendment "to execute a juvenile offender who was older
than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime."" In
1988, the Court decided in Thompson v. Oklahoma that the Constitution
prohibits capital punishment for a person who was less than sixteen
years old when he committed a crime." One year later, the Court decided in Stanford v. Kentucky that the Constitution does not preclude
execution of a juvenile offender who was 16 or 17 at the time of the
crime." Simmons overruled Stanford, holding that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for anyone who was less than eighteen
years old when he committed a crime."
The majority's analysis in Simmons can be divided into four parts.
First, the Court analyzed the activity of state legislatures, concluding on
that basis that there was a national consensus against the death penalty
for juvenile offenders." Next, the Court summarized social science evidence about the differences between juveniles and adults to show that
juveniles have less culpability than adults.42 Third, in light of the diminished culpability of juveniles, the majority argued, "neither retribution
nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the death
penalty on juvenile offenders." 3 Fourth, the majority surveyed international law and practice, concluding that the views of the world community provided confirmation for the Court's judgment that capital punishment is a disproportionate penalty for juvenile offenders."4
The Court's opinion in Simmons relied more heavily on international
law and practice than the majority opinion in Lawrence. Whereas Lawrence devoted only two paragraphs to its discussion of international law,
an entire section of the Simmons opinion focused on international law
and practice. Moreover, Lawrence focused on the European Court and
"Western civilization,"45 largely ignoring the rest of the world.46 In con37. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).
38. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
39. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
40. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551.
41. Id.at 564-67. In fact, the evidence of a "national consensus" was quite weak. See infra
note 55.
42. Id. at 569-72.
43. Id. at 572.
44. Id. at 575-78.
45. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
46. The Court in Lawrence cited an amicus brief in support of the proposition that "other nations," presumably outside of Europe, "have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the
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trast, Simmons systematically reviewed state practice and treaty commitments on a global basis to support its conclusion "that the United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official
sanction to the juvenile death penalty."4
The majority in Simmons stated explicitly that international law did
not control the outcome.48 Even so, there are grounds to question the accuracy of that statement. In Simmons, the Court cited four different treaties that prohibit capital punishment for anyone under eighteen at the
time of the criminal offense. "9 Suppose, hypothetically, that those treaties established an age limit of sixteen, rather than eighteen. If that were
the case, it is unlikely that the Court would have revisited its prior decisions in Thompson and Stanford. The actions of state legislatures do not
support a limit of eighteen, vice sixteen, because states that retain the
death penalty are roughly evenly divided between those that have an age
limit of sixteen and those that have an age limit of eighteen." Moreover,
the majority's analysis of social science evidence and the diminished
culpability of juveniles could easily be utilized to support an argument
in favor of setting the limit at sixteen, rather than eighteen." Indeed, the
international law portion of the Court's opinion is the only portion that
offers a coherent justification for setting the age limit at eighteen, rather
than sixteen. Thus, despite the majority's assertion that international law
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct." Id. at 576. However, the Court did not even attempt to show that the legal principle it adopted in Lawrence is also
endorsed by a majority of the nations in the world.
47. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 575. As the Court noted, every country in the world except for the
United States and Somalia has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits
the juvenile death penalty. Id. at 576. No state party has entered a reservation to preserve its right
to execute juvenile offenders. Id. With respect to state practice, "only seven countries other than
the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990.... Since then, each of these countries has either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice." Id. Since the Supreme Court published its decision in Simmons, Iran has apparently executed one additional juvenile offender. See Nazila Fathi, Rights Advocates Condemn Iran for
Executing 2 Young Men, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A3.
48. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 578 ("The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.")
49. Id. at 576 (citing the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the ICCPR, the American
Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child).
50. See id., Appendix A to Opinion of the Court, at 579-80. The appendix shows that there
are eighteen states that have an age limit of eighteen, three states that have an age limit of seventeen, and seventeen states that have an express or implied limit of sixteen. Where the statute has
no express minimum age, the limit of sixteen is implied by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision
in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
51. Indeed, this portion of the analysis in Simmons is strikingly similar to the corresponding
portion of the Court's analysis in Thompson, where the Court set an age limit of sixteen. Compare
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569-75 with Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833-38.
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was not controlling, Justice Scalia was surely correct to note that "the
views of other countries and the so-called international community take
center stage" in the Court's opinion in Simmons.
B.

Lawrence, Simmons, and MajoritarianDemocracy

As a citizen, I applaud the results of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Lawrence and Simmons. I believe it is morally objectionable to impose
capital punishment on juvenile offenders. And I believe that the government has no business criminalizing private sexual conduct between
consenting adults. However, as a legal theorist, I am troubled by the
process that led to the results in Lawrence and Simmons. Two aspects of
that process are troubling.
First, in Simmons, and to a lesser extent in Lawrence, the Court used
its power of constitutional interpretation to incorporate international
human rights norms into the corpus of domestic law.53 Separation of
powers precepts dictate that it is more appropriate for the political
branches, not the courts, to make decisions about the domestic incorporation of international norms.54 Therefore, insofar as the decisions in
Lawrence and Simmons reflect policy judgments about the desirability
of applying international norms domestically, it would have been preferable for the political branches to make those policy judgments.
Second, in both Lawrence and Simmons the Court used international
law to support countermajoritarian decisions." In both cases, the Court
invalidated laws enacted by democratically elected legislatures. More-

52. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Simmons can fairly be described as a case in which the Supreme Court decided to incorporate an international norm into the U.S. Constitution, because the international norm was
clearly established, and the Court's opinion relied heavily on international law. In Lawrence, the
international norm was not so clearly established, and the Court gave less weight to international
law. Even so, the Court made a policy judgment about the desirability of conforming U.S. law to
the international norm, and that policy judgment did influence the Court's decision to some extent.
54. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 855-59 (1997)
(making a similar point with respect to customary international law).
55. In Simmons, as in other death penalty cases, the Supreme Court claimed to be applying a
majoritarian model, in that the Court's decision was based in part on evidence of a "national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles." See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564-67. The evidence
of such a consensus was quite weak, though. Only eighteen out of fifty states set an age limit at
eighteen years old. Twelve states ban capital punishment altogether. The other twenty states set
an age limit at sixteen or seventeen years old. See id., Appendix A to Opinion of the Court, at
579-80. This is not very compelling evidence of a national consensus in favor of setting an age
limit at eighteen years old.
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over, by basing its decisions on the Constitution, the Court effectively
precluded Congress from participating in decisions on the merits of the
juvenile death penalty and the right of homosexuals to engage in private, consensual sexual activity." Of course, these points apply to any
decision in which the Court invalidates a state law on constitutional
grounds. The fact that the Court invoked international law in support of
its constitutional rulings in Lawrence and Simmons does not alter this
analysis.
John Hart Ely contends that countermajoritarian constitutional decisions are justifiable in cases where majorities abuse their power by enacting laws "infected by prejudice against" disfavored minorities who
are not adequately represented in the political process. 7 Application of
Ely's theory to Lawrence and Simmons would likely lead to different results in the two cases. It is difficult to justify Simmons on the basis of
Ely's theory because juvenile offenders are not the target of prejudicial
laws, and they are represented in the political process through their parents.58 Lawrence, on the other hand, can be defended on the grounds that
the Texas law at issue in that case was motivated by prejudice against
homosexuals, who were not adequately represented in the political
process. However, Ely would probably have been more comfortable
with Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence, which rested
on the Equal Protection Clause, than with Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion, which relied on the Due Process Clause.59 Moreover, assuming
that Ely would have approved the Court's decision in Lawrence, it is
less clear whether he would have approved the Court's reliance on international law.6"
56. There are only two possible ways to reverse a Supreme Court ruling on a question of constitutional law. One possibility is for the Supreme Court to reverse itself; Congress is obviously
excluded from that process. A second possibility is to amend the Constitution. Congress does play
a significant role in the process of constitutional amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. V. However,
given the supermajoritarian requirements for constitutional amendments, there is no realistic possibility of utilizing the amendment process to reverse the outcome in either Lawrence or Simmons. Therefore, as a practical matter, Congress is excluded from the decision-making process.
57. Ely, supra note 2, at 76.
58. Individuals who commit crimes as juveniles are undoubtedly a disfavored minority. However, insofar as there are special laws dealing with juvenile offenders, those laws grant them preferential treatment, as compared to individuals who commit crimes as adults. Therefore, under
Ely's theory, the Court should not issue countermajoritarian constitutional decisions to protect
juvenile offenders because they are not victims of prejudice.
59. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J. 1279, 1289-92 (2005) (analyzing Supreme Court's gay rights jurisprudence in terms of Ely's theory).
60. See Roger P. Alford, In Search of A Theory of Constitutional Comparativism, 52
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From the standpoint of Ely's theory, though, one thing is clear. Assuming that homosexuals and juvenile offenders both merit legal protection, it is preferable, whenever possible, to utilize majoritarian mechanisms to provide that legal protection, rather than relying on the
countermajoritarian mechanism of constitutional adjudication. This article contends that it is possible to develop a different approach to the
domestic application of international human rights law: one that emphasizes direct application of international human rights treaties, rather than
indirect application of international law as an aid to constitutional interpretation. This approach would mitigate the traditional countermajoritarian difficulty by increasing opportunities for congressional participation in the decision-making process.
II.

DIRECT APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

Part II shows that there are significant advantages to applying international human rights treaties directly, rather than applying international
law indirectly as a guide to constitutional interpretation. The analysis is
divided into two sections. The first section analyzes Lawrence and
Simmons as treaty cases; it considers how the defendants in these two
cases would have fared if they had based their claims directly on the
ICCPR, rather than invoking international law as a guide to constitutional interpretation. The second section analyzes the theoretical benefits associated with direct application of the ICCPR.
A.

DirectApplication in Lawrence and Simmons

When the United States ratified the ICCPR, it adopted a reservation
expressly reserving the right to impose capital punishment on individuals less than eighteen years old (the "death penalty reservation").6 The
United States also adopted a declaration stating that the substantive provisions of the treaty are "not self-executing" (the "NSE declaration"). 2
These two conditions impose significant obstacles to direct application
of the ICCPR 3 However, Congress has the power to remove these obstacles by lifting both the death penalty reservation and the NSE declaration. This section analyzes Simmons and Lawrence as treaty cases
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 639, 675-83 (2005) (contending that "[s]tructural majoritarianism is highly
skeptical of the relevance of comparative law in constitutional adjudication").
61. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 6, at 184.
62. See id. at 185.
63. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 47 Va. J. Int'l L. 15 2006-2007

16

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 47:1

based on the (counter-factual) assumption that the United States ratified
the ICCPR without these conditions. The analysis demonstrates that,
without these conditions, the defendants in these cases would have had
viable treaty-based defenses.
1. Simmons as a Treaty Case
Assume that the United States ratified the ICCPR without any RUDs.
Assume, further, that Christopher Simmons argued that the Missouri
Supreme Court was required to reverse his death sentence because the
ICCPR barred imposition of capital punishment in his case. The ICCPR
states expressly: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age."' Christopher Simmons was seventeen years old when he murdered Shirley Crook." Thus,
the treaty imposes a primary duty on the United States not to execute
Simmons, and creates a primary right for Simmons not to be executed.66
If the United States had ratified the ICCPR without the juvenile death
penalty reservation, and Missouri had executed Simmons, it would have
been a violation of the U.S. treaty obligation and of Simmons' right not
to be executed.67
The Supremacy Clause provides that treaties are "the supreme Law of
the Land," and that "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."68 The text of the Supremacy Clause provides a simple conflict
of laws rule: in the event of a conflict between a treaty and state law,
judges are instructed to apply the treaty, not state law.69 Here, there is a
direct conflict between Missouri law, which authorizes Simmons' execution, and the ICCPR, which prohibits that execution. Under the Supremacy Clause, courts are required to apply the treaty. Therefore,
Simmons is entitled to a court order barring his execution, Given the
unambiguous treaty text, and the unambiguous text of the Supremacy
64. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 5.
65. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-57 (2005).
66. A primary duty "is an authoritatively recognized obligation.. .not to do something, or to
do it, or to do it if at all only in a prescribed way." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 130 (1994).

A primary right "is a position which a person has because someone else has a duty in the performance of which the right-holder is in some way interested." Id. at 134.
67. Simmons committed the murder in 1993. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397
(Mo. 2003) (en bane). The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. Therefore, there is no retroactivity issue, because the Covenant was in force at the time of the crime.
68. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
69. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 250-60 (2000).
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Clause, in the absence of RUDs, Simmons is truly an easy case."
2. Lawrence as a Treaty Case
Assume that the United States ratified the ICCPR without any RUDs.
Assume, further, that John Lawrence argued that the Texas Court of
Appeals was required to reverse his conviction because the ICCPR
barred imposition of criminal punishment for private conduct protected
under Article 17 of the treaty.7 ' Article 17 provides: "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence. 7 2 The treaty clearly grants Lawrence a primary right to be free from arbitrary interference with his privacy. It is
less clear, though, whether that right was violated.
Recall the facts in Lawrence. John Geddes Lawrence was "engaging
in a sexual act" with Tyrone Garner in the privacy of his own apartment
when police officers entered the apartment.73 The officers' entry into the
apartment was lawful. When the officers saw the two men having sex,
the officers arrested both men and charged them with "deviate sexual

70. Two possible objections to this argument are as follows. First, one might argue that the
ICCPR would be non-self-executing, even without the NSE declaration. See InternationalHuman
Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 96"h Cong. 315 (1979)
[hereinafter Carter Hearings] (stating that "the substantive provisions of the four human rights
treaties submitted to the Senate in February 1978 are in and of themselves non-self-executing,"
even without the NSE declarations). For a response to this argument, see Sloss, supra note 6, at
153-57.
Second, one might argue, even assuming that the ICCPR is self-executing, it does not create
"individually enforceable rights." The U.S. government has made essentially this argument in
cases involving judicial application of the Geneva Conventions and the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. See Brief for Respondents at 30-37, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006) (No. 05-184), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/3mer/2mer/toc3index.
html (contending that the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War does
not confer individual rights enforceable through suits in domestic courts); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11-31, Bustillo v. Johnson, 126 S. Ct. 2669
(2006) (No. 05-51), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/3mer/lami/toc3index.html
(contending that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not confer individually enforceable rights). Interestingly, though, during oral argument before the Supreme
Court in Bustillo, the government identified Article 2(3) of the ICCPR as a treaty provision that
does create individually enforceable rights. Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Bustillo, 126 S.
Ct.
2669
(2006)
(No.
05-51),
available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral arguments/argument transcripts/04-10566.pdf. Article 2(3) provides expressly for domestic
judicial enforcement of the substantive rights protected under the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note
5, art. 2, para. 3.
71. The petitioners in Lawrence appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals after they were convicted in the Harris County Criminal Court. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
72. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 17.
73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63.
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intercourse."74 Lawrence and Garner were convicted before a justice of
the peace. In terms of the ICCPR, there is no doubt that the arrest and
conviction constituted "interference" with the men's privacy. That interference was not "unlawful" under Texas law. Therefore, if Lawrence
raised an ICCPR defense, the key question for the Court would be
whether the interference with his privacy was "arbitrary."
How should a Texas court determine whether the interference with
Lawrence's privacy was arbitrary? According to the U.S. Supreme
Court: "The clear import of treaty language controls unless application
of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a
result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories."7 In
this case, though, the treaty text itself cannot answer the question
whether the police officers' interference with Lawrence's privacy was
"arbitrary," and so the Court would need to look beyond the text to answer the question.76
In cases where individuals claim violations of their treaty-based
rights, the Supreme Court has often employed the canon of "liberal interpretation." Under this canon, "if a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights which may be claimed under it, and
the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred."77
According to one commentator, the Supreme Court applied this canon
"in nearly a dozen opinions in the first half of the twentieth century."78
The canon of liberal interpretation would clearly support a ruling reversing Lawrence's conviction on the grounds that the Texas statute, as applied, interfered arbitrarily with his right to privacy under the ICCPR.
Another principle of treaty interpretation that the Supreme Court has
endorsed is that the "judgments of our sister signatories" are entitled to
"considerable weight."79 The rationale for this principle is straightfor74. Id. at 563.
75. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)).
76. In the actual Lawrence decision, the Supreme Court apparently believed that the interference with petitioners' rights was arbitrary, although the Court did not use that word. The Court
stated: "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. One of the dictionary
definitions for "arbitrary" is "capricious, unreasonable, unsupported." THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 107 (2d ed. 1987) (unabridged). The Court's conclusion that the statute furthers no legitimate state interest is equivalent to a finding that the statute is
"arbitrary," in this sense.
77. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933).
78. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudenceand a Call.for
Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1913 (2005) (citing cases).
79. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Air
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ward. If U.S. courts do not give considerable weight to the judgments
adopted by other states parties, "the whole object of the treaty, which is
to establish a single, agreed upon regime governing the actions of all the
signatories, will be frustrated."8 This rationale applies with equal force
to decisions rendered by international tribunals that are responsible for
overseeing treaty implementation. The ICCPR created an international
body called the Human Rights Committee that is charged with overseeing treaty implementation." Although the Supreme Court has not passed
on this question, lower courts have held that the decisions of the Human
persuasive authority for interpreting proviRights Committee constitute
82
ICCPR
the
of
sions
There do not appear to be any decisions by national courts applying
Article 17 of the ICCPR in circumstances that are factually similar to
Lawrence. However, the Human Rights Committee has applied Article
17 in one case that is factually similar to Lawrence. Nicholas Toonen, a
homosexual Australian citizen, challenged Tasmania's criminal sodomy
statute on the grounds that it violated his right to privacy under Article
17.83 The Committee ruled that there was a violation of Article 17, stating that Mr. Toonen was "entitled to a remedy," and concluding that "an
effective remedy would be the repeal of sections 122 (a) and (c) and 123
of the Tasmanian Criminal Code."84 Australia ultimately repealed these
laws to conform to the Committee's interpretation of Article 17.11 As
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985)). See also El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan
Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175-76 (1999) ("The opinions of our sister signatories.. .are entitled to considerable weight.") (internal quotations omitted); E. Airlines, Inc., v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 550-51
(1991).
80. Scalia, supra note 12, at 305.
81. See ICCPR, supra note 5, arts. 28-42 (creating Human Rights Committee and defining its
responsibilities).
r
82. See, e.g., United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1288 (1 1 h Cir. 2000) (stating
that the Human Rights Committee's "decisions in individual cases are recognized as a major
source for interpretation of the ICCPR"); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (same).
h
83. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50' Sess., U.N. Doc.
at 97. Tasmania is
1994,
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), reprinted in Int'l Hum. Rts Rep., Sept.
"one of Australia's six constitutive states." Id. 2.1. The Toonen case arose under the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, which permits citizens of states parties to file individual complaints
against their governments with the Human Rights Committee. A U.S. citizen could not file an
individual complaint with the Committee because the United States is not a party to the Optional
Protocol.
84. Id. 9- 10.
85. See Brief for Mary Robinson, Amnesty International U.S.A., Human Rights Watch, Interights, The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No 02-102),
2003 WL 164151, at 11-12, n.15 (stating that "the Tasmanian and Australian Parliaments re-
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noted above, the European Court of Human Rights has also held that the
European Convention on Human Rights protects the right of adult homosexuals to engage in private, consensual sexual activities.86 Thus, international case law supports Lawrence's argument that the Texas statute, as applied, violates his right to privacy under the ICCPR.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned considerations, Lawrence does
not have a "slam dunk" argument under the ICCPR. If his case had been
litigated as a treaty case, the outcome may well have hinged on the position, if any, adopted by the federal executive branch.87 Even so, in the
absence of RUDs, Lawrence could have made a fairly persuasive argument for reversal of his conviction on the grounds that the Texas statute,
as applied, violated his right to privacy under the ICCPR.
B.

Theoretical Benefits of DirectApplication

Assume that, in the absence of RUDs, the defendants in Lawrence
and Simmons could have prevailed on the basis of treaty-based defenses.
The question arises: what are the benefits of adjudicating cases like
Lawrence and Simmons as treaty cases, rather than constitutional cases?
What, in other words, are the benefits of direct application, versus indirect application, of international law?
There are two significant benefits associated with adjudicating Lawrence and Simmons as treaty cases, rather than constitutional cases.
First, if the Court ruled in favor of the defendants on the basis of the
ICCPR, instead of the Constitution, Congress would retain the power to
overrule the Court by enacting legislation superseding the treaty for
purposes of domestic law.88 As John Hart Ely has argued, one of the judiciary's central missions is "to keep the machinery of democratic government running as it should, to make sure the channels of political participation and communication are kept open." 9 In both Lawrence and
pealed these sodomy laws" in response to the Human Rights Committee's decision in the Toonen
case).
86. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
87. One scholar has noted "that judicial deference to the Executive's position on treaty interpretation is the single best predictor of interpretive outcomes in American treaty cases." See
David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1439, 1464-65 (1999).
88. Under long-established doctrine, a later-in-time statute supersedes a prior conflicting
treaty for purposes of domestic law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §

I15(l)(a) (1987). For a scholarly defense of the last-in-time rule, see Julian G. Ku, Treaties as
Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rulefor Treaties and FederalStatutes, 80 INDIANA L.J. 319
(2005).
89. ELY, supra note 2, at 76.
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Simmons, the Court closed the channels of political participation by deciding the cases on constitutional grounds.9" In contrast, if the Court had
applied the ICCPR directly, it could have maintained open channels of
political participation, thereby giving Congress an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. Participation of the political
branches is especially important in cases-such as Lawrence and Simmons-where one of the issues at stake is whether it is desirable to apply international norms domestically.
Second, the treaty provisions on the right to privacy and the juvenile
death penalty, respectively, are much more specific than the constitutional text that the Court applied in Lawrence and Simmons. One of the
main criticisms of the Court's decisions in Lawrence and Simmons is
that the Justices were "legislating from the bench."9 ' Even if one believes that this charge is unwarranted, there is no doubt that the courts
are less vulnerable to this type of criticism if they can identify specific
language in authoritative texts to support their conclusions. If the U.S.
had ratified the ICCPR without RUDs, and the Court ruled that the juvenile death penalty violated the treaty, the Court could not plausibly be
accused of "legislating from the bench" because the treaty itself sets an
age limit of eighteen. 2 Similarly, although the text of the ICCPR does
not explicitly address homosexual conduct, the ICCPR does explicitly
protect the right of privacy. 3 In contrast, the Due Process Clause, which
the Court relied on in Lawrence, does not mention a right to privacy.
Thus, if the Court had based its decision in Lawrence on the ICCPR, it
would have been less vulnerable to the charge that it was "making" law,
instead of "applying" the law.
The main objection to direct application of the ICCPR is that it is not
"made in America." A central tenet of democratic theory is that "We the
People" govern ourselves through laws of our own making. When
courts decide cases on the basis of the U.S. Constitution, they are applying law that has an unassailable democratic pedigree because "We the
People" ratified the Constitution. The ICCPR, in contrast, is the product
90. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
91. See 151 CONG. REC. H1405-05 (Mar. 14, 2005) (statement of Congresswoman Foxx)
("Foreign laws and the beliefs of foreign governments should have no bearing whatsoever when it
comes to interpreting American laws. Judges who take these outside opinions into account are
legislating from the bench and abandoning their duty to interpret the U.S. Constitution.").
92. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 5 ("Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age."). In contrast, the Eighth Amendment
merely prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
93. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 17, para. I ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy.").
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of international negotiations that are disconnected from any local exercise of popular sovereignty.94 Moreover, when judges are called upon to
interpret the ICCPR they are required to consult foreign sources, rather

than American sources.
There are several responses to this objection. First, the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution chose to make treaties the "Law of the Land." But
they did not give the President unfettered discretion to make treaties on
behalf of the United States. Before the President can ratify a treaty, he

must obtain a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate in support of ratification.95 On April 2, 1992, the Senate voted in favor of ratification of the
ICCPR 6 The President subsequently deposited the U.S. instrument of
ratification with the United Nations. Thus, the ICCPR was incorporated
into the corpus of supreme federal law by means of a democratic process within our domestic legal system.97 Therefore, when courts apply the
ICCPR they are not applying foreign or international law: they are applying U.S. federal law. 8
Second, the ICCPR itself is largely the result of a successful diplomatic effort to export American constitutional values to the rest of the
world.9 According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the
ICCPR "is rooted in western legal and ethical values. The rights guaranteed by the Covenant are similar to those guaranteed by the U.S. Consti-

94. Professor Rubenfeld has made a similar argument. See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralismand
Constitutionalism,79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971, 1991-99 (2004) (contrasting "international constirutionalism" with "democratic constitutionalism," and concluding that, for democratic constitutionalism, "it is critical for constitutional law to be made and interpreted not by international experts,
but by national political actors and judges").
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the "Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur").
96. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (Apr. 2, 1992).
97. Some scholars contend that the treaty making process is not truly democratic because the
House of Representatives is excluded from the process. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at
2009. There is no doubt, though, that treaty lawmaking is more democratic than judicial lawmaking, because judicial lawmaking excludes the political branches entirely. Moreover, although
there is no bright line that separates creation of law from interpretation of law, much of what
passes for constitutional interpretation could accurately be described as judicial lawmaking.
98. If Congress enacted legislation to remove the RUDs (in whole or in part) and to authorize
judicial application of the ICCPR, there would be no dispute that the courts were applying federal
law when they applied the ICCPR. Even if Congress does not remove the RUDs, the ICCPR is
still U.S. federal law because the Supremacy Clause says so. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (specifying that treaties are "the supreme Law of the Land"). See also David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing
Treaties: Exposing a ConstitutionalFallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2002) (explaining
that the NSE declaration does not alter the fact that the ICCPR is supreme federal law under the
Supremacy Clause).
99. See LOuis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1-20 (1990).
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tution and the Bill of Rights."'' 0 Therefore, direct application of the
ICCPR would not require U.S. courts to import foreign values. Rather,
direct application of the ICCPR is properly understood as a reimportation of American ideals that have been exported and filtered
through the lens of international law.
Third, judges are already consulting foreign sources to interpret the
Constitution. In the past five terms, there have been at least six Supreme
Court decisions in which one or more Justices has invoked international
or foreign authorities as an aid to constitutional interpretation.'"' Although the use of international law in domestic adjudication is controversial, Justices on both sides of the debate agree that the practice will
continue. For example, Justice O'Connor, who supports this trend, has
stated: "I suspect that with time, we will rely increasingly on international and foreign law in resolving what now appear to be domestic issues."'0 2 Similarly, Justice Scalia, who opposes the trend, agrees: "I expect-or rather, I fear-that the Court's use of foreign law in the
interpretation of the Constitution will continue at an accelerating
pace."'0 3 Direct application of the ICCPR would redirect the "comparative urge" away from constitutional interpretation, where the relevance
of foreign materials is sharply contested, towards interpretation of a
multilateral treaty, where the relevance of foreign sources is undisputed."
Finally, when the courts apply international or foreign law indirectly
by means of constitutional interpretation, they incorporate foreign or international norms into domestic law without giving Congress an oppor100. S. COMM.

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND

POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 2 (1992) [hereinafter ICCPR REPORT].
101. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
572-73, 576 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citing the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in
support of decision upholding the constitutionality of law school's affirmative action program);
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992-93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(citing foreign judicial decisions in support of the view that the "death row phenomenon" is unconstitutional); Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial
of stay of execution) (referring to international consensus opposing the juvenile death penalty);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (majority opinion) (noting that, "within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved").
102. Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies (Oct.
28, 2003), http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor-transcript.pdf.
103. Scalia, supra note 12, at 308.
104. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660-61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating reliance on foreign judicial decisions to help resolve dispute about the proper
interpretation of a multilateral treaty).
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tunity to express its views about the desirability of applying those norms
domestically. In contrast, if the courts applied the ICCPR directly, Congress would have the opportunity to block the domestication of international norms if it objected to the domestic application of a particular
rule. Therefore, if U.S. courts applied the ICCPR to resolve domestic
disputes, there is no danger that we would be ceding our sovereignty to
foreigners because judicial decisions would be subject to a legislative
check. Moreover, direct application of the ICCPR would enhance democracy by facilitating congressional participation in decisions about
the domestic application of international human rights norms.
III. THE PERVERSE EFFECTS OF RUDs
Part III shows that the actual effect of the RUDs has been almost precisely the opposite of the intended effect. The first section demonstrates
that one of the treaty makers' main objectives in adopting treaty reservations was to ensure that decisions related to the domestic application
of international human rights norms would be made through a bicameral
legislative process. The second section shows that the actual effect was
precisely the opposite: the RUDs have channeled decision-making into
constitutional adjudication, thereby excluding congressional participation.
A.

The Intended Effect of RUDs

President Carter first transmitted the ICCPR to the Senate in 1978,
along with four other treaties.' °5 The letter of submittal proposed several
reservations. One reservation concerned freedom of speech. The Carter
Administration noted that Article 20 of the ICCPR, which prohibits certain categories of speech, "conflicts with the Constitution.""'° In contrast, the other proposed reservations, including a proposed death penalty reservation, were not designed to avoid conflicts with the
Constitution, because there are no other provisions of the ICCPR that
prohibit constitutionally protected speech or conduct. Rather, the other
proposed reservations were designed "to harmonize the treaties with existing statutes and common law." ' 7
The State Department Legal Adviser stated that the free speech reser105. See Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, Message from the President of the United
States, S. Exec. Docs. C, D, E, and F (95"h Cong., 2d Sess., 1978) [hereinafter Carter Message].
106. Id. at XI.
107. CarterHearings,supra note 70, at 35 (statement of Jack Goldklang).
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vation was "absolutely essential in order to avoid conflicts with our own
Constitution."'' 8 However, he said: "As to the other reservations, if the
Senate should decide that they are not necessary, I think the administration would be willing to dispense with them."'0 9 The administration was
willing to dispense with the other reservations, including the death penalty reservation, because they were not intended to express substantive
disagreement with the terms of the Covenant. Rather, the purpose of the
other reservations was to ensure that "further changes in our [domestic]
laws will be brought about only through the normal legislative process."'0
After conducting hearings on the ICCPR and other human rights treaties in 1979, the Senate took no further action on the ICCPR until 1991.
In August 1991, President Bush urged the Senate to renew its consideration of the ICCPR.'" The Bush Administration also recommended several reservations," 2 including a juvenile death penalty reservation, but it
did not express opposition to increasing the minimum age to eighteen.
To the contrary, the Administration stated that the reservation would
"leave open the possibility that Congress might adopt legislation, in
connection with ratification of the Covenant or subsequently, prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by those
below 18.""' In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bush Administration representatives emphasized that the proposed
reservations, other than the free speech reservation, were not intended to
convey substantive opposition to the norms embodied in the ICCPR.
Rather, the proposed reservations reflected the belief that, in terms of
democratic process, it would be better to make changes in domestic law
by means of legislation approved by both Houses of Congress.'
108. Id. at 42 (statement of Roberts B. Owen, in response to question from Senator Pell).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 29 (prepared statement of Roberts B. Owen).
11l. See ICCPR REPORT, supra note 100, at 2.
112. See id. at 6-10 (summarizing five reservations, five understandings and four declarations
proposed by the Bush Administration).
113. Id. at 11 (reprinting document transmitted from executive branch to the Senate, entitled
"Explanation of Proposed Reservations, Understandings and Declarations").
114. See InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights: HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong. 15 (1992) [hereinafter ICCPR Hearings] (statement of Richard
Schifter) ("[I]f the Congress desires to change existing domestic laws, it will undoubtedly want to
do so by statute, in the customary, legislative process."). See also id. at 80 (written response to
question from Senator Helms)
(In those few instances where U.S. law differs in its particulars from the Covenant...the
Administration has proposed an appropriate reservation or understanding to the relevant
Covenant provision. In such instances, Congress remains free, of course, to adopt legis-
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The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to report the ICCPR to the full Senate with a resolution of ratification containing the RUDs proposed by the Bush Administration."5 Like the executive branch, the Committee made clear in its report to the Senate that
it was not opposed to making changes in domestic law to conform to the
requirements of the ICCPR. However, the Committee agreed that any
change in domestic law should be endorsed by the full Congress.
The Committee recognizes the importance of adhering to internationally recognized standards of human rights. Although the U.S.
record of adherence has been good, there are some areas in which
U.S. law differs from the international standard. For example, the
Covenant prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by persons below the age of eighteen, but U.S. law allows it for juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18. In areas such
as these, it may be appropriate and necessary to question whether
changes in U.S. law should be made to bring the United States
into full compliance at the international level. However, the
Committee anticipates that changes in U.S. law in these areas
6
will occur through the normal legislative process."
In sum, throughout the process that led to U.S. ratification of the
ICCPR, executive and Senate officials agreed on the desirability of the
various reservations. However, with the exception of the free speech
reservation, the other reservations were not intended to express U.S. opposition to domestic application of the international standard. Rather,
the reservations expressed a preference for using a bicameral legislative
process, and including the House of Representatives in any decision to
' 7
modify domestic legal standards to conform to international norms.

lation conforming U.S. law to the requirements of the Covenant through the customary
legislative process, i.e., through action by the Senate and the House of Representatives
and presentment to the President.).
115. See ICCPR REPORT, supra note 100, at 3.
116. Id. at 4.
117. It is possible, of course, that the Senate and executive branch did not want to express
openly the "actual motivation" for the RUDs, which, according to some critics, was simply hostility to international human rights law. Whatever the actual motivation may have been, the preceding analysis accepts at face value statements made by the Senate and the executive branch. Those
statements are consistent with the view that the political branches were not opposed to domestic
application of the ICCPR per se, but they favored the use of a bicameral legislative process for
making changes in domestic law.
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The Actual Effect of the RUDs

Part II demonstrated that, in the absence of RUDs, the defendants in
Lawrence would have had a viable treaty-based defense to the Texas
criminal sodomy statute. Even so, it appears that they never attempted
to raise such a defense." 8 Their failure to raise a treaty-based defense
may be partially attributable to the fact that lawyers in the United States
are generally unfamiliar with the ICCPR. However, even lawyers familiar with the ICCPR might reasonably have calculated that it was not
worthwhile to raise an ICCPR defense because the NSE declaration
would have defeated that defense. There are sound arguments supporting the view that the NSE declaration was not intended to preclude defendants in state criminal trials from raising treaty-based defenses.' 9
There are also plausible arguments that the NSE declaration is invalid.'20
Regardless, faced with a choice between raising a constitutional defense, which required the Court to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick,'2 ' and
raising an ICCPR defense, which would have required the Court to

118. In their appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals, the defendants in Lawrence raised four arguments: a federal Equal Protection argument, an equal protection argument based on the Texas
Constitution, a federal Due Process argument, and a right-to-privacy argument based on the state
Constitution. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex.App. 2001). The cert petition to the
U.S. Supreme Court raised three issues: whether petitioners' criminal convictions violated the
Equal Protection Clause; whether their criminal convictions violated the Due Process Clause; and
whether Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2002 WL 32101039.
119. See Sloss, supra note 6 (reviewing Senate record associated with ratification of human
rights treaties and concluding that NSE declarations were intended to preclude plaintiffs from invoking the treaties as a basis for a private right of action, but were not intended to preclude defendants from invoking treaties defensively).
120. See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 368
(1996) (stating that "an attempted 'reservation' or 'declaration' which conflicts with ajus cogens
norm must also be void, and such is the case" with respect to NSE declarations); Malvina Halberstare, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Formsof Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 49, 63-70 (1997) (recommending ratification of the Convention without an NSE Declaration and arguing that an NSE Declaration
would be unconstitutional); John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1287, 1302-03, 1310 (1993) (contending
that "the validity of the declaration on non-self-execution is doubtful" and concluding that "U.S.
courts should apply traditional jurisprudence on self-execution to find that the Covenant is the
'law of the land' in the United States"); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope
of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
571, 631-32 (1991) (contending that the NSE Declaration attached to the Torture Convention
"should be disregarded by municipal courts in the United States"). But see Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties,Human Rights, and ConditionalConsent, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 399,
446-51 (2000) (defending the constitutional validity of NSE declarations).
121. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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tackle various interpretive and constitutional issues associated with the
NSE declaration, even lawyers well versed in the complex issues surrounding the NSE declaration might reasonably have decided that the
safest course was to focus on the constitutional claim. Thus, by creating
an obstacle to the viability of a treaty-based defense, the NSE declara-

tion had the effect of channeling litigation into constitutional adjudication.
Part II also demonstrated that, in the absence of RUDs, Simmons
would have had a very strong treaty-based defense to the Missouri death
penalty statute. Even so, Simmons' attorneys never raised an ICCPR defense.'22 As with Lawrence, the failure of Simmons' lawyers to raise a
treaty-based defense may be partially attributable to their lack of familiarity with the ICCPR. However, even if they were international human
rights experts, they might reasonably have concluded that an ICCPR defense was not viable, because they would have had to overcome both

the NSE declaration and the juvenile death penalty reservation. There
are plausible arguments that the juvenile death penalty reservation is invalid.123 U.S. courts that have addressed the issue, though, have uniformly rejected these arguments.2 4 Thus, faced with a choice between
raising a constitutional defense, which required the Court to overrule

Stanford,'25 and raising an ICCPR defense, which would have required
122. The Missouri Supreme Court held that Simmons' execution was "prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
The Court added in a footnote that it was unnecessary to reach the alternative argument that his
execution was barred by the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 413 n.20. The Missouri Supreme
Court's opinion provides no indication that any other argument was presented.
The petitioner's brief to the U.S. Supreme Court identified two questions for review:
1.Once this Court holds that a particular punishment is not "cruel and unusual," and thus not
barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, can a lower court reach a contrary decision
based on its own analysis of evolving standards? 2. Is the imposition of the death penalty on a
person who commits a murder at age seventeen 'cruel and unusual,' and thus barred by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Brief for the Petitioner, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 903158.
123. The Human Rights Committee has stated expressly that the U.S. death penalty reservation is "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty." Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee, United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/50/40, 279 (1995), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. See also Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the
Ban on the Death Penaltyfor Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the InternationalCovenant
on Civil and PoliticalRights, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1311, 1331-32 (1993) (suggesting that the U.S.
death penalty reservation may be "ineffective").
124. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 266-67 ( 5th Cir. 2001); Servin v. State, 32 P.3d
1277, 1285-86 (Nev. 2001); Ex parte Burgess, 811 So.2d 617, 631 (Ala. 2000); Ex parte
Pressley, 770 So.2d 143, 147- 50 (Ala. 2000); Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998).
125. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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the Court to invalidate the juvenile death penalty reservation, a well informed lawyer might reasonably have concluded that the ICCPR defense was simply not worth the effort. Thus, by creating a significant
obstacle to the successful litigation of an ICCPR defense, the juvenile
death penalty reservation had the effect of channeling litigation into
constitutional adjudication.
This result is strangely ironic. One of the primary justifications for
the RUDs was that the RUDs would help ensure that the full Congress,
including the House of Representatives, would participate in decisions
about the domestic application of international human rights norms. In
fact, though, as exemplified by Lawrence and Simmons, the RUDs have
actually channeled decision-making into constitutional adjudication,26
thereby excluding Congress from the decision-making process. Absent
the RUDs, both Lawrence and Simmons could have been litigated as
treaty cases. If the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the defendants
on the basis of the ICCPR, Congress could have reversed the outcome
by enacting legislation to supersede the treaty. Thus, the actual effect of
the RUDs was almost precisely the opposite of the intended effect: they
channeled decision-making into constitutional adjudication, thereby excluding Congress from the decision-making process.

IV. A LEGISLATIVE

PROPOSAL

Parts I to III diagnosed a malady afflicting American democracy. The
problem, in brief, is that federal courts have been invoking international
human rights norms in support of constitutional rulings, thereby preventing Congress from participating in decisions about the domestic application of those norms. Part IV prescribes a legislative remedy for this
problem. The central objective of the proposed legislation is to enhance
the democratic process. This article assumes that the democratic process
is enhanced when Congress exercises greater authority, and the courts
exercise correspondingly less authority, over decisions about the scope
and content of legal protection afforded for fundamental human rights.
To augment congressional authority relative to the courts, the legislation
126. Even without the RUDs, litigants might have preferred to litigate Lawrence and Simmons as constitutional cases, and courts might have preferred to decide the cases on constitutional
grounds, because U.S. lawyers and judges are generally more familiar with constitutional law
than international law. Therefore, the evidence does not establish "but for" causation: one cannot
say that "but for" the RUDs the courts would have avoided constitutional decision-making. However, the evidence does support the conclusion that the RUDs are a key factor that pushes courts
and litigants away from treaty litigation and into constitutional litigation.
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would channel human rights litigation away from constitutional adjudication towards direct application of the ICCPR. Direct application of the
ICCPR would augment congressional authority because Congress could
enact legislation to supersede specific treaty provisions if it disliked the
results of judicial decisions applying the treaty.
Direct application of the ICCPR would not be democracy enhancing
in all cases, however. Legislation authorizing direct application of the
ICCPR is likely to be democracy enhancing only if two conditions are
satisfied. First, the legislation must deal with an area of substantive law
where the federal courts currently function as the primary lawmaking
institution in the United States. Second, the legislation must deal with
an area of substantive law where international law is, at least in some
respects, more rights-protective than current domestic law. Consider
each of these points separately.
First, there is a crucial distinction between areas of substantive law
where Congress has historically framed the primary rules governing the
conduct of actors within the domestic legal system, and areas of substantive law where Congress has been a minor player. The ICCPR
touches upon areas of substantive law in both categories. For example,
there are several provisions of the ICCPR that protect the rights of Native Americans. 2 7 This is an area where Congress has played a dominant
role, and the courts have largely deferred to Congress.'28 Direct application of the ICCPR provisions related to Native Americans would not
augment congressional authority relative to the courts, because Congress is already the dominant player in this area. In contrast, the ICCPR
also contains provisions that relate to capital punishment. 29 This is an
area where, for the past several decades, the Supreme Court has used its
power of constitutional interpretation to craft primary rules governing
the implementation of capital punishment, and Congress has taken a

127. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 1, para. I ("All peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development."); id., art. 26 (prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of "national or social origin"); id., art. 27 ("In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.").
128. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEXAS L.
REV. 1, 25-81 (2002) (tracing the evolution of the plenary power doctrine, as applied to Indian
affairs).
129. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 1 (prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of life);
id., art. 6, para. 2 (restricting the death penalty to "the most serious crimes").
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back seat to judicial lawmaking.'3 ° Direct application of the ICCPR provisions related to capital punishment would enhance congressional authority relative to the courts because judicial decisions applying the
ICCPR would be subject to a legislative check, whereas judicial interpretations of the Constitution preclude further democratic process.
Second, there is an important distinction between areas of substantive
law where international human rights law is more rights-protective than
domestic law, and areas of substantive law where domestic law provides
greater protection for individual rights. For example, the First Amendment generally provides greater protection for freedom of speech than
do the corresponding provisions of the ICCPR.' It seems likely that
heightened speech protections under the First Amendment conform to
the policy preferences of a majority of U.S. citizens. In any case, the
courts cannot utilize the ICCPR to restrict the scope of First Amendment rights because the Constitution takes precedence over treaties.'32
Neither can the courts use the ICCPR to expand the scope of First
Amendment rights because the First Amendment is already more rightsprotective than the ICCPR. Thus, if Congress enacted legislation encouraging courts to decide freedom of speech cases on the basis of the
ICCPR, instead of the First Amendment, the legislation would not have
any practical impact, because courts could not utilize the ICCPR either
to expand or to restrict the scope of First Amendment rights. More
broadly, in areas of substantive law where U.S. constitutional law is
more rights-protective than the ICCPR, it is neither desirable nor feasible for Congress to enact legislation that would redirect litigation away
from constitutional adjudication towards direct application of the
ICCPR.
In contrast, compare freedom of speech to prisoners' rights. The
ICCPR contains two key provisions that protect the rights of prison"' These provisions provide greater protection for prisoners' rights,
ers. 33
130. See infra notes 137-57 and accompanying text (discussing respective roles of Congress
and the federal courts in shaping the rules governing the death penalty).
131. Article 19 of the ICCPR protects freedom of expression. Article 20, however, obligates
states to restrict some speech that is protected by the First Amendment. For example, Article 20
obligates states to prohibit "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred." ICCPR, supra note
5, art. 20, para. 2. In contrast, the First Amendment, subject to a few narrow exceptions, forbids
the government from banning the dissemination of obnoxious ideas. See R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding that a St. Paul bias-motivated crime ordinance was "facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the
subjects the speech addresses").
132. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
133. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 7 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhu-
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in certain respects, than does the Eighth Amendment under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. 3 4 Thus, in the absence of any legislation on
the subject, judges who are otherwise inclined to expand the scope of
constitutional protections for prisoners' rights might well cite international and comparative materials to support their expansive interpretation of U.S. constitutional rights.'35 Therefore, if Congress wants to participate in decisions about the scope and content of prisoners' rights,
Congress could secure its role in the decision-making process by enacting legislation to channel litigation away from constitutional adjudication towards direct application of the ICCPR. More broadly, such legislation makes sense in areas of substantive law where the ICCPR is more
rights-protective than domestic law, because those are the areas of law
where judges are most likely to invoke international human rights law in
support of expansive interpretations of constitutional rights.
In light of the above, Part IV presents a concrete legislative proposal
that would channel capital punishment litigation away from constitutional adjudication and encourage direct application of the ICCPR. The
first section shows that capital punishment is a good candidate for such
legislation because it satisfies the two criteria identified above: the
courts have functioned as the primary lawmakers, and international law
is more rights-protective than domestic law. The second section
sketches the outlines of the legislative proposal. The final section analyzes the likely effects of the proposed legislation. Although the proman or degrading treatment or punishment."); id., art. 10, para. 1 ("All persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.").
134. For example, to succeed in an Eighth Amendment claim challenging conditions of confinement, a prisoner must show that he has been deprived "of a single, identifiable human need
such as food, warmth, or exercise...." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). In contrast, the
European Convention on Human Rights, like Article 7 of the ICCPR, prohibits "degrading treatment." See European Convention, supra note 30, art. 3. The European Court of Human Rights has
held that treatment is "degrading if it is such as to arouse in its victims feeling of fear, anguish
and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them." Iwanczuk v. Poland, 38 E.H.R.R. 8,
51 (2001). "Moreover, it is sufficient if the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes." Id.
135. There are several cases in which state courts and lower federal courts have cited international human rights law in support of decisions favorable to prisoners' rights. See, e.g., Jama v.
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 22 F.Supp.2d 353, 361-66 (D.N.J. 1998) (denying
individual defendants' motions to dismiss claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute for alleged
violations of customary international law); Williams v. Coughlin, 875 F.Supp. 1004, 1009-13
(W.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in support
of decision to deny defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment
claim); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737-41 (Utah 1996) (affirming damages award to prisoner
for violation of the "unnecessary rigor" clause of the Utah Constitution, and citing various international human rights instruments in support of that ruling).
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posed legislation focuses exclusively on capital punishment, a similar
approach could be applied to any area of substantive law where international human rights law is more rights-protective than domestic law, and
where Congress has historically taken a back seat to judicial lawmak1
ing. 36
A.

CapitalPunishment,JudicialLawmaking, and International
Law

1. The Supreme Court as Lawmaker
In Furman v. Georgia,"7 the Supreme Court held that the Georgia and
Texas death penalty statutes violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court
produced a deeply fractured decision, without a majority opinion,'38 but
the practical effect was to invalidate the death penalty nationally, and
force state legislatures to redraft their statutes.'39 Thirty-five states enacted new capital punishment statutes over the next few years.' 0 As a
formal matter, the state legislatures in these thirty-five states were the
"lawmakers" who established the new rules for capital punishment. As a
practical matter, though, the Supreme Court was the real lawmaker, because the legislatures drafted statutes in the shadow of Furman, trying
to deduce from the individual opinions of the various Justices the constitutional rules that would determine whether the death penalty could
survive constitutional scrutiny.
The first major constitutional test of the new death penalty statutes
came in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia.'' In Gregg, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the revised Georgia statute because the new statute
guided the exercise of the jury's discretion by providing "clear and ob-

136. Prisoners' rights is another area of substantive law that satisfies these two criteria. Over
a period of about two decades, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, "federal courts ended up
promulgating a comprehensive code for prison management, covering such diverse matters as
residence facilities, sanitation, food, clothing, medical care, discipline, staff hiring, libraries,
work, and education." MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 41 (1998). In contrast, Congress played a very minor role in the movement to reform America's prisons. See id. at
45. As noted above, international human rights law is more protective of prisoners' rights, in certain respects, than current domestic law. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
137. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
138. In fact, the Court produced nine separate opinions in Furman, with each Justice writing
separately. See id.
139. See RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INAMERICA 18-19 (1991).
140. See id. at 19-20.
141. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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jective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application."'42
The Court's rationale emphasized several features of the Georgia statute: the statute split the trial into a guilt phase and a separate sentencing
phase; 4 3 during the sentencing phase, the defendant had an opportunity
to present evidence of mitigating circumstances; 144 the prosecution was
required to prove at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt;'4 ' and the statute provided for "automatic appeal of all
death sentences to the State's Supreme Court."' 46 Although the Court did
not hold in Gregg that state statutes must include all of these features to
survive constitutional scrutiny, virtually all contemporary death penalty
statutes incorporate these features, because state legislatures know that
they cannot implement their death penalty statutes without Supreme
Court approval. Thus, in effect, the Court in Gregg mandated the basic
contours of state death penalty statutes, and state legislatures were left
47
to implement the rules created by the Supreme Court.'
Since Gregg, the Court has handed down several other decisions that
further restrict the discretion of state legislatures in crafting death penalty statutes. Statutes must give defendants broad leeway to present
mitigating evidence and plea for mercy.' 41 States are not permitted to
execute individuals who are insane, '4 or mentally retarded. 50 Individuals
who were less than sixteen years old at the time of the crime are not eligible for capital punishment.'5' A state cannot impose capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman.' 2 An individual cannot be sentenced to death "solely for participation in a robbery in which another

142. Id. at 198.
143. Id. at 190-91.
144. Id. at 197.
145. Id. at 196-97.
146. Id. at 198.
147. The Court decided four companion cases on the same day as Gregg. In two cases, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of state statutes that were broadly similar to the Georgia statute
at issue in Gregg, although they differed in particulars. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(upholding constitutionality of Texas statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding
constitutionality of Florida statute). In the other two cases, the Court held unconstitutional two
statutes that made the death penalty mandatory in certain circumstances. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). Together, these cases established the basic constitutional parameters for all the states.
148. Lockett v.Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
149. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
150. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
151. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). As discussed above, the Supreme Court
later raised the age limit to eighteen. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
152. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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robber takes life."'55 Aggravating circumstances "must genuinely narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty."'54 The determination
of aggravating factors must be made by a jury, not a judge. 55 These are
the primary rules regulating the implementation of capital punishment
in the United States today. The Supreme Court created every one of
these rules by exercising its power to interpret the Constitution. Thus,
the Supreme Court functions as the primary lawmaker in the area of
capital punishment. State legislatures have very little discretion because
the laws they create must conform to Supreme Court jurisprudence,
which defines the basic parameters of what is permitted and what is
prohibited.
Congress has influenced the rules governing administration of capital
punishment in two ways. First, the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994
sets forth the capital sentencing procedures that apply in federal criminal trials.'56 Like state legislatures, Congress has fairly narrow discretion
in framing these procedures because it must conform to the constitutional rules established by the Supreme Court. Moreover, these procedures apply only in a small number of cases, because the vast majority
of capital cases are tried in state courts, and the Federal Death Penalty
Act does not apply to state criminal trials. Second, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)' 57 AEDPA
made substantial changes to the rules governing federal habeas review
of state court capital convictions, thereby making it more difficult for
federal habeas petitioners to win reversals of their capital sentences.
However, AEDPA does not affect the primary rules governing which
defendants are death-eligible, which crimes are death- eligible, or what
procedures the states may utilize to conduct capital trials. Thus, the primary laws governing administration of the death penalty in the United
States are framed by the Supreme Court, not by Congress.
2. A Comparison ofDomestic and InternationalStandards
When the United States ratified the ICCPR, it adopted a reservation
stating: "That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Consti-

153. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982).
154. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
155. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
156. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, title VI, § 60002(a), Sept. 13,
1994, 108 Stat. 1959 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-98).
157. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified in various amendments to chapters 153 and 154 of the Judicial Code).
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tutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other
than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws
permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of
age."'58 By adopting this reservation, the U.S. tacitly acknowledged that
the international rules embodied in the ICCPR imposed greater restrictions on capital punishment than pre-existing domestic laws. The most
obvious example is that the ICCPR explicitly sets a minimum age of
eighteen,'59 whereas U.S. law at the time of ratification set a minimum
age of sixteen. 6 ° Although the Supreme Court decision in Simmons removed this discrepancy, there are two other ICCPR provisions that appear to impose stricter constraints on capital punishment than current
U.S. domestic law.
First, Article 6(2) states: "In countries which have not abolished the
death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes."' 6 U.S. constitutional jurisprudence also restricts capital
punishment to the most serious crimes. 62 However, the international
standard for "most serious crimes" is more restrictive in certain respects
than the U.S. standard. For example, in Tison v. Arizona,'63 the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment permits capital punishment in
cases where the defendant neither killed nor intended to kill the victim,
but the defendant was a major participant in the criminal enterprise and
manifested a reckless indifference to the value of human life. In contrast, there is substantial authority for the proposition that the phrase
"most serious crimes" in Article 6(2) restricts the application of capital
punishment to intentional crimes. Thus, the Eighth Amendment permits
the death penalty for some defendants who neither killed nor intended to
kill, whereas the ICCPR arguably prohibits capital punishment for anyone who did not kill intentionally. 6"
Second, Article 6(1) provides: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life."'6 5 As above, this principle is firmly rooted in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.'66 However, there is a plausible argument that the
158. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 6, at 184.
159. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 5.
160. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
161. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 2.
162. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult woman).
163. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
164. See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text (elaborating on this point).
165. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 1.
166. See. e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
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international standard is more restrictive, in certain respects, than the
domestic constitutional standard. International authorities have suggested that significant geographical disparities in the implementation of
capital punishment would be contrary to the international rule prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of life.' 67 Several studies in recent years have
documented significant geographical disparities in the implementation
of capital punishment in the United States-both across states,' 68 and
across counties within a particular state. 61 9 For example, one statistical
study has shown that, within New York state, "murderers outside New
York City and its suburbs are ten times more likely to face the death
penalty than those inside the New York City region.""'7 In light of the
Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,'"' though, it is doubtful whether this type of statistical evidence could be used to support a
successful constitutional challenge to the New York death penalty statute. In contrast, this type of statistical evidence might well support a
claim that the New York statute, as applied, violates the ICCPR rule
prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of life.
(1972).
167. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary exections, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/61, Adden76-79 (1998), E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3, availdum: Mission to the United States of America,
able at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/mainec.aspx. (noting that the "great discretionary powers"
of prosecutors contribute to geographical disparities across counties within the same state and
increase the risk of arbitrariness); Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.LN/I1.71, doe. 9
rev. 1, 62-63 (1987) (concluding that the U.S. had violated its international human rights obligations because implementation of capital punishment "results in a patchwork scheme of legislation which makes the severity of the punishment dependent not primarily on the nature of the
crime committed, but on the location where it was committed").
168. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey
(1988-2000) (Sept. 12, 2000) (showing that, from 1995-2000, 42% of the cases submitted to the
Attorney General for review came from just five of the ninety-four federal districts, and during
the same period, forty of the ninety-four federal districts never recommended seeking the death
penalty for any defendant).
169. See, e.g., Report of the [Illinois] Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, at 196
(April 2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commissionreport/
index.html ("There was a sharp difference in the rate at which defendants were sentenced to death
in different regions of the state, even after controlling for factors in aggravation. Among cases
with a first degree murder conviction, 8.4% of those from rural counties, 3.4% of those from urban counties, 3.3% of those from collar counties and 1.5% of those from Cook County resulted in
a death sentence. These regional differences were statistically significant.").
170. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 358 ( 3 rd ed. 2003) (citing Alan Finder, New York's New Death Penalty: Most Defendants are White, from Upstate, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999, at A23).
171. 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (discounting statistical evidence of racial discrimination because defendant failed to "prove that the decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory
purpose") (emphasis in original).
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The preceding analysis shows that international human rights law
provides greater protection for capital defendants, in certain respects,
than the corresponding provisions of domestic law. Moreover, the federal courts have been the primary lawmakers in this area, while Congress has taken a back seat to judicial lawmaking. Given these two facts,
if Congress does nothing, it is likely that courts will continue to invoke
international human rights norms in support of decisions that expand the
constitutional rights of capital defendants, and Congress will be excluded from participating in decisions about the domestic application of
international human rights norms. However, Congress has the power to
legislate a role for itself in the decision-making process. The next section sketches the outlines of such legislation.
B.

ProposedLegislation

If Congress wants to participate in decisions about the domestic application of international norms restricting the application of capital
punishment, it has the power to enact legislation to augment its role in
the decision-making process. Such legislation would have three basic
elements: 1) direct the President to remove the death penalty reservation
attached to the ICCPR; 2) authorize capital defendants to invoke Article
6 of the ICCPR as a defense to capital charges (including on federal habeas review); and 3) in cases where capital defendants raise either a
constitutional defense or a treaty-based defense, require courts to address the treaty-based defense first, and to avoid constitutional decisions
in cases where defendants could obtain relief on the basis of the treaty.
Consider each of these points separately.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Simmons, one might think
that it is unnecessary to remove the death penalty reservation to the
ICCPR because the purpose of the reservation was to preserve the U.S.
right to impose capital punishment on juvenile offenders. The text of the
reservation, though, is actually broader. It states "[t]hat the United
States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person... duly convicted under existing
or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen
years of age."'72 Thus, the reservation appears to limit the scope of U.S.
obligations under Article 6(2), which restricts the death penalty to "the
most serious crimes," and under Article 6(1), which prohibits arbitrary
172. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 6, at 184.
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deprivation of life. The reservation thus inhibits defendants from raising
treaty-based defenses and channels litigation into constitutional adjudication, thereby excluding Congress from the decision-making process.
Accordingly, if Congress wants to augment its role in the process, the
legislation should direct the President to remove the reservation.'73
The second element of the legislation would authorize capital defendants to raise defenses based on Article 6 of the ICCPR. By explicitly
authorizing such defenses, Congress would effectively remove the NSE
declaration with respect to Article 6. This would greatly simplify litigation, because courts would not be required to resolve the difficult interpretive and constitutional issues surrounding the NSE declaration.'74 The
proposed Article 6 defense should apply in both state and federal court,
because both state and federal criminal defendants have the opportunity
to raise constitutional defenses to capital charges. The legislation should
also authorize federal habeas review of state court decisions applying
Article 6. This may require minor amendments to the current habeas
statute, " but most of the key rules governing federal habeas review of
state criminal convictions would be unaffected.'76
Legislation to remove the death penalty reservation and authorize direct application of Article 6, without more, would not channel litigation
away from constitutional claims. Capital defendants could still raise
both constitutional defenses and treaty-based defenses. Since courts are
generally more familiar with constitutional law than with international
human rights law, many courts would be inclined to decide cases on
constitutional grounds, not treaty grounds, if given a choice between the
173. Technically, Congress cannot remove the reservation itself, because withdrawal of the
reservation requires official communication with the treaty depositary, and that is a Presidential
function.
174. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. For analysis of the proper interpretation
of the NSE declaration, see Sloss, supra note 6. For analysis of the constitutional issues, see
Sloss, supra note 98, at 35-44.
175. The habeas statute already provides that habeas corpus is a potential remedy for individuals who are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (same). However, other portions of the habeas statute preclude relief unless the petition alleges a constitutional
violation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (barring a second or successive habeas petition
unless "the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law") (emphasis
added); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (barring the issuance of a certificate of appealability unless "the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right") (emphasis
added). Congress would have to consider whether and how to modify these provisions to encompass claims based on the ICCPR.
176. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 59-271(2003) (providing
detailed explanation of current rules governing federal habeas review of state criminal convictions).
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two.
Therefore, to encourage courts to apply the treaty, the proposed legislation would also mandate constitutional avoidance. In a famous concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,117 Justice
Brandeis declared that "[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."' 178 In
the seventy years since Ashwander, the Supreme Court and lower courts
have invoked this doctrine of constitutional avoidance in numerous
cases to justify their refusal to address constitutional issues presented
for decision. 79 The legislation would require both state and federal
courts to apply the Ashwander avoidance principle in cases where capital defendants raised defenses on the basis of the ICCPR. Specifically,
the legislation would direct both state and federal courts to consider
treaty-based defenses before considering constitutional defenses, and to
avoid ruling on the constitutional issues if relief could be granted on the
5 The courts would remain free to address constitubasis of the ICCPR.1
tional questions presented if the case could not be resolved through application of the treaty.
In capital punishment cases where defendants raised only constitutional defenses, and not treaty-based defenses, the legislation would require courts to raise the ICCPR sua sponte, and to address any treatybased defenses before passing on the constitutional defenses. Legislation of this type would help maintain a legislative check on the judiciary
by forcing courts, whenever possible, to decide cases on grounds that
leave the door ajar for subsequent legislative action. The legislation
should provide one exception to the rule mandating constitutional
avoidance. In cases where there is a Supreme Court decision directly on

177. 297 U.S. 338 (1936).
178. Id. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
179. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 73-74 (1995)
("[T]he Court still routinely interprets statutes in order to immunize them from constitutional objection, and in so doing diminishes the number of decisions on overtly constitutional grounds that
it and the lower federal courts must make."). Prof. Schauer's analysis focuses on a slightly different interpretive principle, also articulated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander: "When the validity
of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348. As
Prof. Schauer notes, the two principles are "very closely related" because, under both principles,
"constitutional adjudication is to be treated as a last resort." Schauer, supra,at 72.
180. One might legitimately question whether such legislation is constitutional. For analysis
of this issue, see infra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
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point that prohibits capital punishment, but the application of Article 6
is uncertain, courts should not be required to apply the treaty.'8 ' On the
other hand, if there is a Supreme Court decision directly on point that
authorizes capital punishment, courts should still be required to decide
whether Article 6 prohibits capital punishment. Thus, for example, if the
proposed legislation had taken effect before the Missouri Supreme
Court decided Simmons, the Missouri Supreme Court could have decided Simmons on the basis of Article 6, thereby avoiding the awkward
task of predicting that the U.S. Supreme Court, if given the opportunity,
would overrule its own constitutional precedent.'82
The proposed legislation would not prevent courts from creating new
rules of constitutional law in areas of substantive law within the scope
of the ICCPR. Nor would the legislation prevent courts from citing international or foreign sources in their constitutional decisions. Such legislation, though, would be plainly unconstitutional, because Congress
does not have the power to tell the federal courts how to interpret the
Constitution,'83 nor does it have the power to prohibit citations of disfavored sources. 84
C.

Likely Effects of the ProposedLegislation
To analyze the likely effects of the proposed legislation, it is helpful

181. For example, U.S. constitutional law clearly prohibits capital punishment for the crime
of raping an adult woman. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). In contrast, there is no authoritative international rule directly on point.
182. In Simmons, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded "that the Supreme Court of the
United States would hold that the execution of persons for crimes committed when they were under 18 years of age... is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper,
112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact
that the U.S. Supreme Court had previously held that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit
execution of criminals who were sixteen or seventeen when they committed their crimes. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Missouri Supreme Court's decision that Stanford, in
effect, was no longer good law, drew sharp criticism from Justice Scalia. See Simmons, 543 U.S.
at 628-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Same-Sex Marriage, The Constitution, and Congressional
Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: Be Carefid What You Wish For, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 363, 378 (2005) ("Congress has no power either to resolve the substantive merits of the
constitutional claims itself, or dictate to the courts-state or federal-how to decide the constitutional claims.").
184. The authors of House Resolution 97 and House Resolution 568 apparently recognized
this point, because their proposals to discourage reliance on foreign law are framed as "sense of
the House" resolutions, rather than binding legislation. See H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.RES.568.IH:, and House Res. 97,
109th Cong. (2005), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c 109: H.RES.97.IH:..
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to consider a specific issue: whether an individual who was convicted of
felony murder, but who neither killed nor intended to kill, may be sentenced to death. In Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment precludes the death penalty for an individual "who
aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by
others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed." '85 In Tison v. Arizona, though, the Court revised the Enmund rule, holding that it is constitutionally permissible to impose the death penalty on a "defendant
whose participation is major and whose' 86mental state is one of reckless
indifference to the value of human life."'
Article 6(2) of the ICCPR arguably imposes a stricter standard: it restricts capital punishment to the "most serious crimes."' 87 Under international law, the phrase "most serious crimes" is generally understood to
encompass only intentional crimes. For example, the Statute of the International Criminal Court is designed to ensure "that the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not
go unpunished."'' 8 Under the statute, individuals are generally not
criminally liable unless the crime is "committed with intent and knowledge."'8 9 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has adopted numerous resolutions construing the phrase "most serious crimes" so as to restrict capital punishment to intentional crimes. 9 The U.N. Economic
185. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
186. 481 U.S. 137, 152 (1987).
187. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 2 ("In countries which have not abolished the
death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes.").
188. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(July 17, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/ (emphasis added).
189. Id., art. 30, para. 1 ("Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.").
190. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res.
7(f), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/59 (2005) (urging states that maintain the death
2005/59,
penalty to ensure "that the notion of 'most serious crimes' does not go beyond intentional
crimes"); U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res.
2004/67, 4(f), U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/RES/2004/67 (2004) (same); U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights,
The Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res. 2003/67, 4(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/67
(2003) (same); U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res.
4(c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/77 (2002) (same); U.N. Comm'n on Human
2002/77,
4(b), U.N. Doc.
Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res. 2001/68,
E/CN.4/RES/2001/68 (2001) (same); U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, The Question of the Death
3(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (2000) (same); U.N.
Penalty, C.H.R. Res. 2000/65,
3(b), U.N.
Comm'n on Human Rights, Question of the Death Penalty, C.H.R. Res. 1999/61,
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (1999) (same); all available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/
mainec.aspx.
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and Social Council has also endorsed the principle that the death penalty
is reserved only for intentional crimes. 9 Thus, if the U.S. removed its
reservation to Article 6 and Congress authorized direct application of
the ICCPR in U.S. courts, a capital defendant who neither killed nor intended to kill, but who was death-eligible under Tison, would have a
strong treaty-based defense to capital punishment. 92
In light of this disparity between domestic and international law, this
section shows that the proposed legislation would have three likely effects. It would augment the role of Congress in establishing substantive
rules governing the use of capital punishment, produce additional constraints on implementation of the death penalty, and lead to greater use
of international law in U.S. courts.
1. GreaterRole for Congress
The central goal of the proposed legislation is to shift decisionmaking responsibility from the judicial branch to the legislative branch,
thereby enhancing democratic accountability for decisions about the
substantive rules governing implementation of capital punishment. Assume that Congress enacted the proposed legislation, and a state court
applied the ICCPR to invalidate the death sentence of a defendant who
neither killed nor intended to kill, but who satisfied the Tison culpability
requirements. If Congress disagreed with the decision, Congress could
enact legislation authorizing states to impose capital punishment in
cases that satisfied the Tison standard.'93 Thus, by encouraging courts to
decide capital punishment cases on the basis of the ICCPR, the legislation would provide an opportunity for Congress to participate in decisions about the substantive limits to be imposed on the implementation
of the death penalty.
If courts construed the ICCPR to preclude capital punishment for defendants who neither killed nor intended to kill, it is unlikely that Congress would enact legislation to authorize capital punishment for such
191. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection
of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, E.S.C. Res. 1984/50,
1, U.N. Doc.
E/RES/1984/50 (1984) ("In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, capital punishment may be imposed only for the most serious crimes, it being understood that their scope
should not go beyond intentional crimes.").
192. Indeed, given international law authorities that restrict capital punishment to intentional
crimes, a person who actually killed a victim, but did so recklessly, not intentionally, would arguably be exempt from capital punishment under Article 6(2).
193. Some may object that such legislation is not within the scope of Congress' enumerated
powers. For a response to that objection, see infra notes 227-38 and accompanying text.
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defendants. Even so, the very fact that Congress has an opportunity to
act would be a boon to participatory democracy. Lobbyists on both sides
of the issue could express their views to Congress. Individual Congressmen and Senators could introduce legislation. Congressional committees could hold hearings on the issue. In short, the policy debate
would move from the courtroom to the Capitol.' 94 From the standpoint
of Elysian theory, that would be a healthy development for American
democracy.
Suppose, though, that Congress did enact legislation to authorize
capital punishment for defendants who neither killed nor intended to
kill. The Supreme Court could still invalidate the legislation on constitutional grounds. Therefore, critics may argue, the proposed legislation
does not really transfer decision-making authority from the courts to
Congress, because the Supreme Court gets the last word.'95 Granted, no
legislation can deprive the Supreme Court of its power over constitutional interpretation. Even so, the Court would be very reluctant to impose a constitutional restriction on capital punishment after Congress
had enacted legislation for the express purpose of removing that restriction. In its recent death penalty jurisprudence, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized the need to present objective evidence of a national consensus to support a constitutional ruling that a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.'96 If Congress enacted legislation to authorize capital punishment for defendants who neither killed nor
intended to kill, it would be anomalous for the Court to hold that there
was a national consensus against the death penalty for such defendants.
Therefore, although the Supreme Court would retain the theoretical
power to invalidate congressional legislation, the Court would be

194. Federalists may object that these issues are best decided at the state level, not the national level. For a response to this objection, see infra notes 213-26 and accompanying text.
195. Indeed, a hardened skeptic might argue that the Supreme Court's primary objective is to
maximize its own power. If that is true, the Court could promote that objective by construing the
ICCPR narrowly to provide only minimal protection for individual rights, while construing the
Constitution broadly to provide maximum protection for individual rights. By adopting this strategy, the Court could exclude Congress from the decision-making process. Not being a hardened
skeptic, though, this author doubts that the Court would adopt an interpretive strategy designed to
minimize legislative power and to maximize judicial power.
196. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (noting that Eighth Amendment
analysis begins with "a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the
enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question"); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
312 (2002) (stating that Eighth Amendment analysis "should be informed by objective factors to
the maximum extent possible," and that the "most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures") (citations omitted).

HeinOnline -- 47 Va. J. Int'l L. 44 2006-2007

2006]

USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ENHANCE DEMOCRACY

unlikely to exercise that power.'97
Others may object that the goal of transferring decision-making authority from the courts to Congress is a misguided objective, because
constitutional lawmaking by the courts is needed to protect individual
rights. This objection has force if applied to areas of substantive law
where the ICCPR offers less protection for individual rights than current
constitutional law. In those areas, continued constitutional lawmaking
by the courts is necessary to protect individual rights.'99 The proposed
legislation, however, focuses on areas of substantive law, such as capital
punishment, where the ICCPR is more rights-protective than current
constitutional law. In those areas, it is possible to utilize the ICCPR to
protect individual rights without sacrificing the principles of majoritarian democracy. In fact, as the next section demonstrates, the proposed
legislation is likely to yield greater protections for capital defendants,
while still preserving open channels for political participation.
2. More Restrictions on CapitalPunishment
In recent years, the Supreme Court has created several new constitutional rules that restrict the flexibility of state governments in implementing capital punishment.'99 The proposed legislation would likely
lead to additional constraints, but the new constraints would be based on
the ICCPR, not the Constitution. Once again, the issue of capital punishment for defendants who neither killed nor intended to kill illustrates
this point. Absent the proposed legislation, there are two significant obstacles to overruling Tison v. Arizona. First, the force of stare decisis
supports continued adherence to the Tison rule, absent compelling rea197. One might think that this argument does not apply outside the context of the Eighth
Amendment because the Eighth Amendment is the only constitutional provision where courts
base their constitutional rulings on evidence of a "national consensus." It is true that evidence of a
national consensus is not a formal element ofjudicial doctrine in other areas of constitutional law.
Even so, the Court is generally reluctant to adopt constitutional decisions that deviate too far from
the will of national majorities, for fear of harming its own legitimacy. Thus, in the type of scenario described above, where a court invalidates a state law on the grounds that it conflicts with
the ICCPR, and Congress subsequently enacts legislation authorizing states to adopt similar laws,
notwithstanding the ICCPR, the Court would presumably view such legislation as evidence of the
majority will. That evidence, at a minimum, would be a factor weighing in favor of the constitutionality of the legislation.
198. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting death penalty for crimes
committed by individuals less than eighteen years old); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)
(holding that jury, not judge, must make finding that prosecution proved at least one aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting death
penalty for mentally retarded).
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sons for overruling that decision. Second, in evaluating the question
whether to overrule Tison, the Court would review state legislation to
determine whether there is evidence of a national consensus that capital
punishment is disproportionate punishment for a defendant who neither
killed nor intended to kill."' At present, only 16 of the 38 states that authorize capital punishment prohibit the death penalty for accomplices
who did not intend to kill, whereas 22 states permit the death penalty in
such circumstances.' Thus, there does not appear to be a national consensus against capital punishment for accomplices who did not intend to
kill. Absent stronger evidence of such a national consensus, it is
unlikely that the Court would overrule Tison on constitutional
grounds. 2
On the other hand, if Congress did enact the proposed legislation, and
a capital defendant raised a treaty-based challenge to a state law that
permitted capital punishment for defendants who neither killed nor intended to kill, a court could invalidate the state law on the grounds that
it conflicts with the ICCPR, without having to overrule Tison.2°' Moreover, in assessing the question whether an unintentional homicide qualifies as a "most serious crime" within the meaning of Article 6 of the
ICCPR, the Court would not need to review state legislation in search of
a national consensus, because such evidence is not relevant to ascertain200. See supra note 196.
201. See Melanie A. Renken, Revisiting Tison v. Arizona: The Constitutionality of Imposing
the Death Penalty on Defendants Who Did Not Kill or Intend to Kill, 49 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J.
(forthcoming 2006-07) (draft on file with author) (providing detailed analysis of state legislation).
202. There is a plausible argument to the contrary. First, with respect to stare decisis, the Supreme Court has rendered two decisions in the past few years overruling its own constitutional
precedents related to capital punishment. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (overruling
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). The Tison decision is from the same era as other cases
that were recently overruled. The Court decided Tison in 1987. It decided both Stanford and
Penrv in 1989. Five Justices who were in the majority in Simmons and Atkins are still on the
Court. Thus, stare decisis is arguably not a large hurdle.
Second, under established Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court also considers, in
addition to evidence of a national consensus, whether capital punishment serves the goals of retribution and deterrence. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 568-75; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21. There is no
plausible argument that the threat of capital punishment deters accomplices who neither killed nor
intended to kill. Indeed, the majority in Tison made no such claim. See Tison, 481 U.S. 137. Instead, the Tison majority argued that accomplices who act with reckless indifference to human
life are sufficiently culpable to deserve capital punishment. It is possible that a majority of the
Court could be persuaded otherwise by evidence of an international consensus supporting the
view that individuals who neither killed nor intended to kill are not sufficiently culpable to deserve capital punishment.
203. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
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ing the correct interpretation of the treaty." Thus, adoption of the proposed legislation would increase the likelihood that U.S. courts would
invalidate state laws that permit capital punishment for accomplices
who did not intend to kill. More broadly, since international law tends to
favor greater constraints on capital punishment than current domestic
law, legislation authorizing direct application of the ICCPR in capital
punishment cases would likely lead to increased restrictions on the use
of the death penalty.
It does not necessarily follow, though, that those who support capital
punishment would oppose the legislation. Most capital punishment supporters want to ensure that the system operates fairly and impartially, to
the extent that is humanly possible. Researchers have completed several
studies in recent years indicating that implementation of the death penalty is neither fair nor impartial."' By authorizing direct application of
the ICCPR, the legislation would provide courts another tool they could
utilize to help ensure that the system operates fairly and impartially."6
Courts are justifiably hesitant to use the Constitution as such a tool, because no system of criminal law is perfect, and it is a very delicate task
to draw a line separating constitutionally permissible flaws from constitutionally impermissible flaws. If courts attempted to draw such a line
on the basis of the ICCPR, though, the task would be less problematic
because judicial line-drawing would be subject to congressional revision. Thus, some capital punishment supporters might reasonably conclude that the trade-off inherent in the proposed legislation is a good
one. They would accept greater restrictions on capital punishmentdesigned to make the system less arbitrary-in exchange for an enhanced legislative role in the process that enables Congress to override
judicial decisions that impose excessive constraints on the implementation of capital punishment.

204. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (codifying generally accepted principles of treaty interpretation).
205. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text. See also David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrarinessand Discriminationin the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002); David C. Baldus
et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the Post-FurmanEra. An Empirical and
Legal Overview, with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998).
206. The ICCPR prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para.
1. Thus, the treaty requires states that maintain the death penalty to ensure that the procedures
utilized to decide which defendants live, and which defendants die, are not arbitrary. Although the
studies cited in the preceding footnote do not specifically address U.S. compliance with the
ICCPR, they do present empirical data suggesting that the United States may be violating the
ICCPR's prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life.
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3. IncreasedReliance on InternationalLaw
Even if Congress does not adopt the proposed legislation, U.S. courts
are likely to continue citing international and foreign law in decisions
about the scope and content of constitutional rights.21 7 When courts decide cases on constitutional grounds, the primary factors shaping judicial decisions are constitutional text, structure, precedent, and evidence
of original intent. International law and foreign law remain secondary,
or perhaps even tertiary factors.
In contrast, if Congress adopted the proposed legislation, courts
would apply the ICCPR directly to resolve some disputes. When applying the ICCPR directly, the treaty text would be the primary factor governing treaty interpretation, supplemented by extrinsic sources that shed
light on the intentions of the treaty drafters. 8 Courts would also be
guided by decisions of the Human Rights Committee applying the
ICCPR, °' and by decisions of other international tribunals applying
analogous provisions of other human rights treaties."0 In short, adoption
of the proposed legislation would invariably lead to increased judicial
reliance on international and foreign authorities.
It does not necessarily follow, though, that "internationalists" would
favor the proposed legislation, or that "sovereigntists" would oppose
it." ' In recent years, U.S. courts have tended to adopt very narrow interpretations of rights protected under international human rights and humanitarian law treaties.2 ' Therefore, internationalists may fear that U.S.
207. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
208. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 204, arts. 31-32. The basic
rule of treaty interpretation is: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Id., art. 31, para. 1. The remainder of Articles 31 and 32 elaborate on this rule.
209. See, e.g., United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1288 (1 1 th Cir. 2000) (stating
that the Human Rights Committee's "decisions in individual cases are recognized as a major
source for interpretation of the ICCPR"); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (same).
210. The various international human rights tribunals, such as the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), and the Human
Rights Committee, routinely cite each other's decisions as persuasive authority for interpreting
similar provisions of the different treaties for which they are primarily responsible. Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that, under the proposed legislation, U.S. courts would consult decisions
of the ECHR and the IACHR as persuasive authority for interpreting analogous provisions of the
ICCPR. If the legislation addressed only capital punishment, ECHR decisions would have limited
applicability because all the parties to the European Convention on Human Rights have abolished
capital punishment.
211. I borrow the term "sovereigntists" from Professor Spiro. See Peter J. Spiro, The New
Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, 79 Foreign Affairs 9 (2000).
212. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (adopting narrow interpreHeinOnline -- 47 Va. J. Int'l L. 48 2006-2007
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courts would construe ICCPR rights narrowly. Thus, internationalists
might oppose the legislation on the grounds that direct application of the
ICCPR by U.S. courts would set dangerous precedents weakening international legal protection for individual human rights.
Some sovereigntists would undoubtedly oppose the legislation on the
grounds that they are philosophically opposed to any judicial reliance on
international or foreign authorities. Many sovereigntists, though, have a
genuine commitment to using majoritarian procedures that provide democratic accountability. Since the proposed legislation provides a legislative check on judicial lawmaking, some sovereigntists would likely
endorse the legislation for that reason, despite the fact that it would lead
to increased judicial reliance on foreign and international law.
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS

There are three potential constitutional objections to the proposed
legislation. The first objection, which I will call the "federalist" objection, is that the ICCPR itself is unconstitutional, and any federal legislation implementing the ICCPR would be unconstitutional, insofar as it
purports to regulate matters that are reserved to the States under the
Tenth Amendment. The second objection, which I will call the "internationalist" objection, assumes that the ICCPR is valid and binding on the
states, but holds that Congress lacks the power to enact legislation superseding the ICCPR, except insofar as that legislation falls within the
scope of some other enumerated congressional power. The third objection is that Congress lacks the power to mandate judicial application of
the Ashwander avoidance principle. Part V contends that these objections are without merit, and that the proposed legislation is constitutionally valid.
A.

The FederalistObjection

The federalist objection begins with the premise that the ICCPR addresses matters beyond the scope of Congress' Article I powers. For example, the federalist might argue, nothing in Article I authorizes Congress to enact legislation prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. Since
Congress lacks the power to legislate in this area, it follows that a treaty
prohibiting the juvenile death penalty-even if binding on the United
tation of the scope of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (adopting narrow
interpretation of the territorial scope of the ICCPR).
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States internationally-cannot bind the States domestically, because the
power to set an age limit for capital punishment is a power "reserved to
the States" under the Tenth Amendment.2 3 Thus, insofar as the ICCPR
purports to regulate matters that are beyond the scope of Congress' legislative powers, the treaty is not binding on the states, and Congress
lacks the power to make it binding on the states. Therefore, Congress
cannot enact legislation authorizing direct application of the ICCPR, at
least not in suits where individuals allege human rights violations by
state or local governments or officers.
In Missouri v. Holland,2 4 the Supreme Court held that the treaty

makers have the power to conclude treaties regulating matters beyond
the scope of Congress' enumerated powers, that such treaties empower
Congress to enact legislation that would otherwise be beyond the scope

of its Article I powers,' 15 and that matters properly within the scope of
the treaty power are not reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment. 16 Federalist scholars acknowledge that, if Missouri is still good
law, then the federalist objection fails. Nevertheless, federalist scholars
urge the Court to overrule Missouri, contending that the case was
wrongly decided. 7
This article will not attempt to provide a detailed defense of the
Court's holding in Missouri; other very able scholars have already done
so. "8 Nevertheless, three points merit brief discussion. First, until the
Supreme Court says otherwise, Missouri is still good law. Given the
continued vitality of Missouri, it follows that ratification of the ICCPR
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
214. 252 U.S. 416 (1920)
215. The State of Missouri argued that there are federalism limits on the treaty power, "and
that one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the
powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do." Id. at 432. The Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument, holding "that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national
well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act
could." Id. at 433.
216. Id. at 432 ("To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment,
reserving powers not delegated to the United States, because by Article 2, Section 2, the power to
make treaties is delegated expressly.")
217. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99
MICH. L. REV. 98, 100 (2000); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005). See also Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty
Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006).
218. See especially David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The HistoricalFoundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
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is a valid exercise of the treaty power, and that the ICCPR, at least in
the absence of RUDs, is binding on the states under the Supremacy
Clause. 29 This does not mean that there are no federalism limits on the
treaty power. 2 1 It does mean, though, that Congress has the power to
enact legislation providing for direct judicial application of the ICCPR
in cases where individuals allege treaty violations by state or local governments or officers.
Second, even if the Court overruled Missouri, Congress might still
have the power to enact legislation providing for direct application of
the ICCPR. Professor Stephens has argued that Congress has the power
under the Define and Punish Clause 22 1 to regulate a broad range of conduct addressed in modern human rights treaties, beyond what it could
2
regulate under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. If
she is correct, then a decision to overrule Missouri would not impose
significant constraints on the government's ability to use the treaty
power to impose international human rights norms on the states.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court rejected Professor Stephens'
argument, and it overruled Missouri, then the federal government could
not utilize the treaty power to impose international human rights norms
on the states. 22 31 Even so, the Supreme Court could still use its power of
constitutional interpretation to impose international human rights norms

219. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. In the absence of RUDs, there is one provision of the ICCPR
that might not be a valid exercise of the treaty power. Article 20 arguably obligates the United
States to restrict speech that is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. The United
States adopted a reservation to limit the scope of its obligations under Article 20 and eliminate
conflicts between its treaty obligations and constitutional requirements. See Multilateral Treaties,
supra note 6, at 184. Without that reservation, Article 20 would arguably have been an invalid
treaty provision, because any conflict between a treaty and the Constitution must be resolved in
favor of the Constitution. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
220. For example, Professor Vazquez has argued that the treaty power cannot be used to abrogate state sovereign immunity associated with the Eleventh Amendment. See Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 713 (2002). Although that
conclusion is subject to criticism on other grounds-see Susan Bandes, Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and "The Plan of the Convention," 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 743 (2002)-it is not inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's holding in Missouri.
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.10 (granting Congress the power "[tlo define and punish... Offences against the Law of Nations").
222. See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress 's Power to "Define and
Punish...Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2000).
223. Some aspects of international human rights law overlap with valid federal civil rights
statutes, and are therefore within the scope of Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. However, it is generally agreed that other aspects of international human rights law address matters beyond the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment powers.
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on the states. This is effectively what happened in Simmons. 24 Thus, as
a practical matter, a decision to overrule Missouri would not increase
the power of the States relative to the federal government. Rather, it
would increase the power of the federal courts relative to the political
branches, because the federal courts would retain the power to make international human rights norms binding on the States by means of constitutional interpretation, but the federal political branches would lack
the power to make international human rights norms binding on the
States.
From the standpoint of Elysian theory, therefore, a decision to invalidate the proposed legislation on Tenth Amendment grounds would be
wrongheaded on two counts. First, it would be contrary to principles of
majoritarian democracy, because it would enhance judicial power and
diminish congressional power.225 Second, insofar as the ICCPR provides
legal protection for disadvantaged minorities, a decision to invalidate
the proposed legislation would weaken legal protections for those minorities. 226 In short, whereas the proposed legislation mitigates the countermajoritarian difficulty by reinforcing protections for individual rights
in a manner that is consistent with principles of majoritarian democracy,
a decision that the legislation violates the Tenth Amendment would exacerbate the countermajoritarian difficulty by weakening protection for
individual rights and diminishing congressional power.
B.

The InternationalistObjection

The internationalist objection begins with the premise that Missouri
is good law. Given this premise, it follows that Congress has the power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to provide for direct judicial application of the ICCPR. However, Missouri held only that Congress has
the power to enact legislation that is "a necessary and proper means to
execute the powers of the Government. 227 This includes legislation to
implement a treaty, because the Treaty Power is one of the federal gov224. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
225. See Ely, supra note 2, at 87 (contending that the Constitution leaves substantive values
"almost entirely to the political process and instead the document is overwhelmingly concerned... with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of government").
226. See id. at 76 (suggesting that the Court should "concern itself with what majorities do to
minorities, particularly... laws 'directed at' religious, national, and racial minorities and those infected by prejudice against them").
227. See Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432 ("If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the
validity of the statute under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government.").
HeinOnline -- 47 Va. J. Int'l L. 52 2006-2007

2006]

USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ENHANCE DEMOCRACY

emnment's powers. Legislation to supersede a treaty, though, is not a
necessary and proper means to execute the Treaty Power. Therefore, the
internationalist might argue, Congress lacks the power to enact legislation to supersede the ICCPR, except insofar as Congress acts pursuant
to some other enumerated power.
Consider a concrete example. Assume that Congress authorized direct application of Article 17 of the ICCPR, and the Supreme Court held
in Lawrence that the Texas sodomy statute was invalid because it conflicted with the ICCPR.228 This article contends that one of the key benefits of direct application is that Congress could, in this hypothetical
case, enact legislation authorizing States to violate Article 17 if Congress disliked the results of the Court's decision. The internationalist
objection is that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower
Congress to enact such legislation because legislation authorizing States
to violate a treaty is not a necessary and proper means to execute the
Treaty Power. Moreover, the internationalist continues, although the
later-in-time rule authorizes Congress to enact legislation to supersede a
treaty,229 that rule applies only insofar as Congress is acting within the
scope of some Article I power.23 Neither the Commerce Clause nor the
Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to regulate private consensual sodomy. Therefore, if the Court struck down Texas' sodomy law
on the grounds that it violated the ICCPR, Congress would be powerless
to intervene. Consequently, the ostensible benefits of direct application
are more theoretical than real, because much of the substantive content
of the ICCPR concerns matters that are beyond the scope of Congress'
Article I powers.
In assessing this objection, it is worthwhile to recall Justice Holmes'
statement in Missouri: "[I]t is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters
requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be found."23' Judicial decisions establishing the later-in-time rule suggest that the power
228. See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1871).
230. To the best of my knowledge, no scholar has suggested this limitation on the later-intime rule. However, prominent international scholars have urged the Court to overrule the laterin-time rule. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty A Century
of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 869-72 (1987); Jordan J. Paust,
Rediscovering the RelationshipBetween CongressionalPower and InternationalLaw: Exceptions
to the Last-in-time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393, 398-416 (1988). Accordingly, they would presumably endorse this limitation as a second-best alternative.
231. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433 (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903)).
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to violate a treaty is a power that must belong to every national government. For example, Justice Curtis defended the later-in-time rule as follows:
To refuse to execute a treaty, for reasons which approve themselves to the conscientious judgment of the nation, is a matter of
the utmost gravity and delicacy; but the power to do so, is prerogative, of which no nation can be deprived, without deeply affecting its independence. That the people of the United States
have deprived their government of this power in any case, I do
not believe. That it must reside somewhere, and be applicable to
all cases, I am convinced. I feel no doubt that it belongs to congress. 32
Although Justice Curtis wrote these words in his capacity as a circuit
justice, the Supreme Court subsequently endorsed the later-in-time rule,
largely on the strength of Justice Curtis' analysis. 33' Thus, under the
later-in-time rule, Congress' power to enact legislation to supersede a
treaty for purposes of domestic law is "applicable to all cases ,"234 including cases where the treaty regulates matters that, prior to ratification,
would have been beyond the scope of Congress' Article I powers.
This construction of the later-in-time rule is consistent with the text
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. That Clause grants Congress the
power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carall... Powers vested by this Constitution in the
rying into Execution ...
' The later-in-time rule, as articuGovernment of the United States."235
lated by Justice Curtis, presupposes that the power to "refuse to execute
' is a power vested in the federal government. That power is
a treaty"236
not vested in the federal government explicitly by the text of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it is vested implicitly because the power to violate
232. Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (C.C. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799).
233. The earliest Supreme Court decisions endorsing the later-in-time rule all cite Justice
Curtis' opinion in Taylor v. Morton as authority for the rule. See Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889) (stating that the issue of conflicts between treaties and statutes
"was fully considered by Mr. Justice Curtis, while sitting at the circuit, in Taylor v. Morton");
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (stating that the "subject was very elaborately
considered at the circuit by Mr. Justice Curtis"); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-98 (1884)
(stating that Justice Curtis "in a very learned opinion exhausted the sources of argument on the
subject" of conflicts between statutes and treaties); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621
(1871) (citing Taylor v. Morton as authority for the proposition that "an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty").
234. Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 786.
235. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18.
236. Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 786.
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a treaty is an inherent attribute of national sovereignty, and under the
Constitution the federal government possesses all those powers that are
2' Thus, Congress has the power to eninherent in national sovereignty. 37
act legislation authorizing states to violate treaties because such legislation is necessary and proper for carrying into execution the federal government's power to refuse to execute a treaty.
The view that Congress has the power to supersede all treaties, including those regulating matters that would otherwise be beyond the
scope of Article I, is consistent with Elysian theory. Ely's theory favors
constitutional interpretations that maintain open channels of political
participation.238 If the Supreme Court endorsed the internationalist objection, it would close the channels of political participation because
Congress would be powerless to reverse even unintended consequences
of certain treaty ratification decisions. Moreover, if the Senate knew that
Congress lacked that power, the Senate would be less likely to approve
treaty ratification in the first place. Therefore, Elysian theory provides
an additional rationale for rejecting the internationalist objection.
C.

Mandating ConstitutionalAvoidance

There are three possible constitutional objections to the proposed rule
mandating constitutional avoidance. The first objection is that the proposed rule, as applied to federal criminal trials, would preclude federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over federal constitutional defenses.
The question whether Congress has the power to "strip" federal courts
of jurisdiction over constitutional claims has been hotly debated for
decades.239 Assuming, arguendo, that the Constitution limits Congress'
237. The argument presented here is somewhat different from the position endorsed by Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-20 (1936). 1
agree with Justice Sutherland that "the investment of the federal government with the powers of
external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution." Id. at 318.
However, his claim that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,"
id. at 319 (quoting John Marshall's statement in the House of Representatives), is difficult to reconcile with the later-in-time rule, which vests Congress with substantial authority to derogate
from the United States' international obligations. Moreover, there are sound structural and functional reasons for vesting the power to violate treaties in Congress, rather than the President. See
Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the PresidentBound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 97, 160-64 (2004).
238. See Ely, supra note 2, at 76 ("It is an appropriate function of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic government running as it should, to make sure the channels of political participation and communication are kept open.").
239. The literature on court-stripping legislation is quite extensive. Classic articles include
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
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authority to enact so-called "court-stripping" legislation, the legislation
proposed herein does not run afoul of those constitutional limits because
it does not deprive courts of jurisdiction over any constitutional claim or
defense. The proposed legislation would require federal courts to consider treaty-based defenses before considering constitutional defenses,
and to avoid ruling on constitutional issues if relief could be granted on
the basis of the ICCPR. The courts, however, would retain the power to
decide constitutional questions if the case could not be resolved through
application of the treaty. ' In short, the proposed rule mandating constitutional avoidance is a procedural rule, not a jurisdictional rule. Therefore, the proposed rule does not contravene constitutional limits on
Congress' power to manipulate federal jurisdiction, whatever those limits may be.
A second potential objection is that Congress cannot order state
courts to refrain from applying federal law, because the Supremacy
Clause obligates state courts to enforce federal law."' As above, this objection misconceives the nature of the proposed avoidance rule. The
proposed rule would not prevent state courts from deciding the merits of
federal constitutional defenses, except in cases where capital defendants
could obtain relief on the basis of the ICCPR. In cases where defendants
could not obtain relief on the basis of the ICCPR, state courts would be
obligated to address the merits of federal constitutional defenses, except
insofar as procedural default rules barred consideration of a particular
defense. Moreover, in cases where defendants could obtain relief on the
basis of the ICCPR, state courts would still be applying supreme federal
law, in accordance with the mandate of the Supremacy Clause, because
the ICCPR is itself supreme federal law. 42 In cases where a defendant
raises multiple defenses, there is nothing in the Supremacy Clause, or
elsewhere in the Constitution, that requires courts to decide the merits of
every defense raised if the case can be resolved on the basis of a single
Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362 (1953). For a recent debate addressing these issues as they pertain to draft legislation that
would have stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over claims related to the Defense of Marriage
Act, see Michael J. Gerhart, The ConstitutionalLimits to Court-Stripping, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 347 (2005), and Martin H. Redish, Same-Sex Marriage, The Constitution, and Congressional Power to Control FederalJurisdiction:Be Careful What You Wish For, 9 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 363 (2005).
240. See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
241. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stipulating that the Constitution, statutes and treaties are "the
supreme Law of the Land," and that "the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby"); see also
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that state courts are obligated to apply federal law).
242. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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defense.
The third objection is that Congress does not have the power to prescribe procedural rules for state courts. In addressing this objection, I
assume that Article I does not grant Congress the power, for example, to
prescribe an entire code of procedural rules for state courts.243 Even so,
the Supreme Court has held that state courts are obligated to apply federal procedural rules in at least some cases where federal rights are at
stake.244 Moreover, although scholars dispute the scope of Congress'
power to regulate procedures in state courts,245 there appears to be a
scholarly consensus that Congress has a limited power to mandate state
court application of federal procedural rules in specific categories of
cases where federal rights are at stake, at least insofar as application of
federal rules would have only minimal impact on the ordinary operation
of state court procedural rules.246 The proposed constitutional avoidance
rule fits easily within the bounds of this scholarly consensus, because
the rule is an integral part of the proposed statutory design, it would apply only in death penalty cases, and it would require state courts to
243. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructureof FederalSupremacy,
32 IND. L. REV. 111,129 (1998) (questioning whether Congress has a broad "power to supplant
state procedural law in any federal question case").
244. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (holding that federal law preempted
state procedural rule because state rule "conflicts in both its purpose and effects with the remedial
objective" of section 1983); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 36163 (1952) (holding that state court was required to submit factual issues to jury, even though state
rules would allow judge to decide those issues); Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294,
298-99 (1949) ("Strict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens
upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws.").
245. Compare Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State
Courts: Implicationsfor the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 99-108 (1998)
(defending a relatively broad federal power to mandate state court application of federal procedural rules) with Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WiSC. L. REV. 39, 183-84 (1995) (contending that congressional power to
displace state court procedural rules is not "limitless") and Jackson, supra note 243, at 127
("Mandating wholesale use of federal rules of procedure in state court cases based on federal law
is in tension with the.. .history of the relationship of state and federal courts.").
246. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., FederalRegulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J.
947, 951 (2001) ("It is well established that state courts must...enforce federal procedural rules
that are part and parcel of an adjudicated federal claim."); Collins, supra note 245, at 184 (conceding that federal law trumps state procedural rules if there is "a clear congressional statement to
that effect"); Jackson, supra note 243, at 129 n.78 ("If the underlying substantive law of tort liability for the hazards of tobacco smoking were federalized.. .Congress would have substantial
power to provide for particular procedures 'integral' to or 'bound up with' the statutory
scheme.. and that these would be enforceable in the state courts."); Redish & Sklaver, supra note
245, at 100-01 ("[A]ssuming that commandeering of state courts falls within congressional
power... the implication is all but inescapable that state courts would have to employ federal procedures when expressly mandated by federal statute.").
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avoid constitutional decisions only if the case could be resolved through
direct application of the ICCPR.
CONCLUSION
Many scholars have argued that the domestic application of international human rights law is inherently anti-democratic. This article offers
a more nuanced assessment of the relationship between international
human rights law and majoritarian democracy. Indirect application of
international law as an aid to constitutional interpretation is antidemocratic in one sense: when courts apply international law indirectly,
Congress is excluded from decisions about the domestic application of
international norms. Direct application of the ICCPR, however, could be
democracy enhancing.
This article has proposed legislation to channel human rights litigation away from constitutional adjudication towards direct application of
the ICCPR. If applied to areas of substantive law where Congress has
historically taken a back seat to judicial lawmaking, such legislation
would enhance democracy by restraining judicial lawmaking and augmenting Congress' role in crafting the substantive human rights norms
to be applied in domestic courts. Moreover, if applied in areas of substantive law where international law is more rights-protective than domestic law, the proposed legislation would bolster protection for individual rights. Thus, if Congress selectively authorizes direct application
of the ICCPR, domestic application of international human rights law
could help mitigate the traditional countermajoritarian dilemma by
strengthening protection for individual rights in a manner that is consistent with the principles of majoritarian democracy.
Congress has an institutional interest in restricting the scope of judicial lawmaking, and in asserting its authority to make decisions about
the scope and content of substantive rules governing the protection of
individual human rights in the United States. Since the proposed legislation would promote Congress' institutional interest in this respect, one
might think that individual Senators and Representatives would eagerly
endorse the proposed legislation. There are, however, at least two countervailing factors that significantly reduce the likelihood that Congress
will enact legislation along the lines proposed in this article: congressional abdication and xenophobic nationalism. Consider each separately.
The term "congressional abdication" refers to a pattern of congressional actions in which Congress voluntarily relinquishes portions of its
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constitutional lawmaking authority to other actors in the federal system.
The phenomenon of congressional abdication has been the subject of
extensive scholarly commentary.24 7 Although there is no scholarly consensus about why Congress abdicates its power, the most persuasive explanation emphasizes the divergence between the institutional interests
of Congress and the individual interests of its members.248 Congress has
an institutional interest in maintaining, and perhaps even augmenting,
its power relative to the President, the courts and administrative agencies. Most members of Congress have an individual interest in securing
re-election. Frequently, when members pursue their individual interests
in re-election they produce decisions that undermine Congress' institutional interest in defending its own power. Legislation authorizing direct
application of the ICCPR is unlikely to help individual members of
Congress secure re-election. Support for such legislation might even
harm a member's re-election prospects in some cases.249 Therefore,
unless legislation authorizing direct application of the ICCPR can be
packaged in a way that promotes the members' individual interests in
re-election, or at least that does not harm those interests, such legislation
is unlikely to secure the requisite majority in both Houses of Congress.
The problem of congressional abdication is exacerbated, in this case,
by xenophobic nationalism. Congress as an institution is suspicious of
undue "foreign" influence over "domestic" affairs. The recent controversy involving foreign control of terminal operations at American ports
is a case in point. DP World, a company owned by the government of
Dubai, agreed to purchase a controlling interest in a British shipping
company that operates cargo terminals at some of the largest ports in the

247. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Abdication by Another Name: An Ode to Louis Fisher, 19 ST.
LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 65 (2000); Thomas F. Eagleton, Congress: Does It Abdicate Its
Power?, 19 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 1 (2000); Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives: States of Congressional Abdication, 19 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2000); Steven
Puro, Congress-Supreme Court Relations: Strategies of Power, 19 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV.
117 (2000); Dennis J. Tuchler, Has Congress Abdicated its Legislative Authority to its Staf?, 19
ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 107 (2000); Douglas R. Williams, CongressionalAbdication, Legal Theory, and DeliberativeDemocracy, 19 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 75 (2000).
248. See, e.g., Douglas R. Williams, Demonstrating and Explaining CongressionalAbdication: Why Does CongressAbdicate Power?, 43 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 1013, 1040-41 (1999) (suggesting that "legislators find it more 'profitable'-in terms of getting re-elected-to devote their
time and energy to activities that return selective, or "private," benefits to their constituents than
to engage with larger issues of the public good").
249. This may depend to some extent on the substantive right at issue. Legislation using the
ICCPR to enhance protection for freedom of religion is likely to be much more politically popular
than legislation using the ICCPR to expand protection for prisoners' rights.
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United States." ' Despite assurances from the Bush Administration that
the planned acquisition did not raise any significant national security
concerns, 25 1 a bipartisan group of Congressmen strenuously opposed the
deal.' 2 Just one month after reaching agreement, DP World bowed to
intense congressional opposition and promised to transfer its operations
at U.S. ports to an American company.2 3 Although the opponents of the
Dubai ports deal used the rhetoric of national security to express their
concerns, it seems likely that the national security rhetoric was merely a
smokescreen to disguise the anti-Arab prejudice that actually fueled political opposition to the planned acquisition. 4 Similarly, Congressmen
who oppose judicial reliance on international and foreign law use the
rhetoric of democracy to express their opposition. 2 ' Even so, there are
grounds for suspicion that the rhetoric of democracy is a smokescreen to
disguise the xenophobic nationalism motivating measures such as
House Resolution 97, which expresses "the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States should not be based on judgments,
laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions." '56
Congress could dispel that suspicion by enacting legislation along the
lines proposed in this article. In contrast to House Resolution 97, which
would have no practical effect whatsoever, 7 legislation authorizing direct application of the ICCPR would actually promote the values of majoritarian democracy by curtailing judicial control, and increasing con250. See Heather Timmons, Dubai Wins Bidding Battle for P.&O., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2006, at C4; Patrick McGeehan, Despite Fears, a Dubai Company Will Help Run Ports in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at Bi.
25 1. See Elisabeth Bumiller and Carl Hulse, Panel Saw No Security Issue in Port Contract,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at Al.
252. See Carl Hulse, A Rebellion in the G.O.P, New York Times, March 9, 2006.
253. See David E. Sanger, Under Pressure,Dubai Company Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
March 10, 2006, at Al.
254. Imports of cargo at U.S. ports do raise significant national security concerns, but "America's port security challenge is not about who is in charge of our waterfront." Stephen E. Flynn
and James M. Loy, A Port in the Storm Over Dubai, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at A19. The
more significant issue is the fact that the U.S. inspects only a "tiny percentage" of containers entering U.S. ports. Id. The lack of a meaningful inspection regime raises the prospect that terrorists
could smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States through our ports. But this has
nothing to do with the nationality of the company that holds the contract to manage port operations.
255. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
256. See H.R. Res. 97 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c 109:H.RES.97.IH:..
257. Since House Resolution 97 is merely a "sense of the House" resolution, it has no binding
effect on the courts.
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gressional control, over the rules governing protection of individual
human rights. If Congress continues to pursue measures such as House
Resolution 97, and eschews legislation to authorize direct application of
the ICCPR, one might reasonably conclude that individual members of
Congress are more interested in political grandstanding than in making
the difficult policy decisions that constitute the real business of democratic self-governance.
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